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Abstract
Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been widely 
applied as credible models for the development and 
operation of public infrastructure. Through private sector 
involvement, the public sector manages to better control 
costs and debt levels and, in return, offers to the private 
sector access to new long-term investment opportunities. 
For PPPs to be successful, proper identification and 
management of risks are pivotal and reward mechanisms 
need to be carefully constructed to allow both sides to 
play to their respective strengths, benefit from the deal 
and extract value from it.
This study intends to answer two key questions: 
(i) How to apply PPPs and similar partnering modalities
(e.g. concessionary models) to the development and
sustainable operation of Science and Technology Parks
(STPs) and Innovation Districts?1 (ii) What are the
key features of currently existing PPPs for STPs and
Innovation Districts?
The study was initiated through the distribution of 
an online survey among members of the International 
Association of Science Parks and Areas of Innovation 
(IASP). The survey collected information on Science 
and Technology Parks or Innovation Districts 
operating through three main models of Public/Private 
cooperation: (1) Long-term partnership involving a 
degree of risk sharing (the closest to a traditional PPP); 
(2) Jump-in model where private investors are
involved at a later stage of a project’s development;
or (3) Management Partnership. An analysis of survey
results covering the three models is presented in chapter 4
of this report.
Chapter 5 presents eight detailed case studies of Science 
and Technology Parks or Innovation Districts falling 
under the above referenced model 1. In-depth interviews 
with the managers of the mentioned parks/districts were 
conducted to understand the reasons and perceived 
benefits of entering into a partnership with the private 
sector. The interviews revealed complex rationales for 
involving the private sector, going well beyond the evident 
desire of keeping public debt low, utilising idle land, 
buildings or other infrastructure, and leveraging private 
sector management expertise and efficiency.
Private sector involvement has been recognised as 
beneficial — and an important catalyst — for the 
development of broader innovation ecosystems bringing 
together all stakeholders: government, academia, industry 
and civil society (quadruple helix) around a shared 
long-term vision and strategy. The involvement of private 
partners, with shared long-term interests, is believed not 
only to generate efficiencies for the realisation of specific 
projects but to trigger a “crowding-in effect” leading to 
better results in terms of research commercialisation, 
investment attraction, innovation and, ultimately, 
economic growth and job creation.
Public Private Partnerships continue, however, to carry 
considerable risks, from the perspective of public sector 
partners, in particular in relation to: (i) specific legal 
(structuring, enforcement, sanctions and remedies, 
optionality, etc.); (ii) financial (valuation, revenue 
projections, allocation of risks and benefits, sustainability, 
etc.) arrangements and (iii) the need to ensure proper 
alignment with the private sector around a shared long 
term vision for the development of a particular STP or 
Innovation District.
New exploratory research is planned for 2020-2021 
— that will build on the results of this study — to bring 
together expertise on both EU policies and investment, 
with expertise in finance and private investment to 
develop a new hybrid financial model for innovation 
districts. Such a model should be able to inform 
investment strategies of both public and private investors 
(in particular institutional investors) and increase the pool 
of resources and expertise available to support the creation 
and operation of innovation districts as engines of urban 
transformation and sustainable and inclusive growth.
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Executive Summary
Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been widely 
applied as credible models for the development and 
operation of public infrastructure. Through private 
sector involvement, the public sector manages to 
better control costs and debt levels and, in return, 
offers to the private sector access to new long-term 
investment opportunities. For PPPs to be successful, 
proper identification and management of risks 
are pivotal and reward mechanisms need to be 
carefully constructed to allow both sides to play to 
their respective strengths, benefit from the deal and 
extract value from it.
This study intends to answer two key questions:  
(i) How to apply PPPs and similar partnering modalities 
(e.g. concessionary models) to the development and 
sustainable operation of Science and Technology Parks 
(STPs) and Innovation Districts?2 (ii) What are the 
key features of currently existing PPPs for STPs and 
Innovation Districts? 
This study was initiated through the distribution of an 
online survey among members of the International 
Association of Science Parks and Areas of Innovation 
(IASP). The survey collected information on Science 
and Technology Parks or Innovation Districts 
operating through three main models of Public/Private 
cooperation: (1) Long-term partnership involving a 
degree of risk sharing (the closest to a traditional 
PPP); (2) Jump-in model where private investors are 
involved at a later stage of a project’s development; 
or (3) Management Partnership. An analysis of survey 
results covering the three models is presented in 
chapter 4 of this report.
Chapter 5 of this report presents eight detailed case 
studies – completed through additional desktop 
research and interviews - of Science and Technology 
Parks or Innovation Districts falling under the above 
referenced model 1.
These were: (1) Ørestad Innovation City, Copenhagen, 
Denmark; (2) Here East & Plexal, London, 
United Kingdom; (3) Johanneberg Science Park, 
Gothenburg, Sweden; (4) Gav-Yam Negev Advanced 
Technologies Park, Be’er-Sheva, Israel; (5) Technology 
Park Brno, Czech Republic; (6) Technology Park 
Ljubljana, Slovenia; (7) Ann Arbor SPARK, Michigan, USA; 
and (8) Milan Innovation District (MIND), Milan, Italy.
By analysing the case studies mentioned above the 
authors have identified some critical success factors, 
described in detail below, for the development of 
STPs or Innovation Districts through Public–Private 
collaboration.3
Public Strategy
Public partners have a vital role to play through 
the provision of strategic leadership and vision, 
recognition and legitimacy throughout the lifecycle 
of science park or innovation district projects. 
The involvement of the public partner needs to be 
sustained throughout the project lifecycle and needs 
to go well beyond the simple provision of land or 
buildings and leverage all available instruments 
in the public policy arsenal from urban planning 
to economic and fiscal incentives, when feasible, 
in order to attract the necessary critical mass of 
actors (cf. universities and research centres, SMEs, 
corporates or investors) to the area. In the absence of 
sustained public engagement and support, that goes 
beyond the initial provision of land or buildings, even 
the involvement of private partners may not deliver 
a sustainable appreciation of the area and its assets. 
Without adequate public sector support, projects risk 
to be unable to achieve critical mass, making them 
unprofitable for private sector partners. Conversely, 
in the absence of proper private sector oversight, 
excessive real estate inflation poses a concrete risk of 
crowding out early stage innovators, thus undermining 
the sustainability of a given project.
The re-development, in collaboration with the private 
sector, of capital assets in public possession (be they 
land and/or buildings) can be organised and financed 
in different ways. In some cases, where concessionary 
models are utilised (e.g. the 99 years concession 
used for MIND), the private partner invests significant 
capital, manages and operates the infrastructures and 
JRC Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks
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also delivers a return to the public partner throughout 
the lifetime of the project.
In other cases, public land is transferred to a publicly 
owned but privately managed organisation (as seen 
in the case study on Copenhagen). Another alternative 
is to recover the publicly borne cost of construction 
(debt) through the tenant companies that become the 
eventual owners of the buildings (as in Ljubljana). 
All these alternatives have advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of certainty, predictability 
and flexibility.
In each and every one of the scenarios described 
above, duration, conditions, financial and state aid 
implications are all elements that warrant attentive 
consideration from the very outset. The referenced 
options constitute alternatives to traditional public 
procurement of construction services, their main 
benefit being that the long-term strategic interests 
of the public and private partner(s) are fully aligned 
behind the success of the project.
Preparation
Proper feasibility analysis needs to be undertaken 
before initiating any element of an STP or innovation 
district project. This process is, by definition, lengthy 
and depending on the scale and complexity of 
individual projects, it may take several months, or 
even years. The feasibility phase needs to incorporate 
extensive consultation with stakeholders and potential 
end-customers of the local innovation ecosystem 
(including academics, trade associations, venture 
capitalists, and technology transfer experts) with a 
view to establishing the existence of the necessary 
demand to make the project successful. Once 
feasibility and demand analysis are complete, detailed 
specifications for the project can be developed, 
including scope, valuations and financial projections as 
well as legal and financial structuring. 
Some of the analysed case studies have shown that 
this preparation phase may take several years before 
the STP or Innovation District becomes operational. 
A thorough preparation helps ensure the long-term 
success and financial sustainability of the project. 
Contributions of PPP partners
The case studies indicate that, in general, public 
sector partners contribute the land and drive 
the development of projects (conduct of studies, 
management of administrative procedures, 
mobilisation of stakeholders, networking 
and promotion). 
Private partners, generally, deliver financial resources 
for the development of infrastructures as well as 
know-how and resources for management and 
operation of the STP/District. That being said, our 
case studies covered both projects in which single 
developers provided financing for development of the 
infrastructure in its entirety, as well as instances in 
which financing for construction of the infrastructure 
was recovered from eventual tenants that decided to 
purchase the space they occupy.
An element that is often overlooked, and 
consequently under-resourced, is the development 
and orchestration of the innovation community, an 
activity that requires resources, both human and 
financial, as well as specific expertise. 
The stronger the private partner and the higher its 
financial contribution to the development of the 
STP, the stronger is its role in decision-making on 
the strategy and management of the STP. Where 
private partners are numerous, and consist of either 
several smaller real estate developers (Johanneberg 
Science Park, Gothenburg) or a group of innovative 
SME tenants, the initial project promoter has a strong 
position in the STP management company and say 
in its strategy (cf. city of Ljubljana, City of Ann Arbor 
and the University of Michigan, Chalmers University 
and the city of Gothenburg).
Governance
As a general rule, representation of all triple helix 
stakeholders (government/city, academia, the private 
investors/partners) and, to an extent, the civil society4 
in decision-making or supervisory bodies (e.g. the 
Board of Directors) is common practice to ensure a 
balance between strategic goals on the one hand 
and the effective and efficient operation of STPs/ 
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Districts on the other. For instance, the industrial 
specialisation of a project is often jointly defined 
and decided upon by all partners starting from the 
very initial preparatory phase of the project, with 
potential adjustments made throughout the lifecycle 
of the project. Academia plays a major role by 
delivering the high-quality human capital necessary 
to accommodate the growth and expansion of a park 
or district. 
Location, connectivity and liveability
Most of the projects covered by this study are 
located in immediate proximity – as an extension 
of urban areas – to large cities of regional or 
national significance, with strong economies and 
business concentration. Many of the urban areas 
in question exhibit strong and stable demand 
in specific industries combined with buoyant 
real-estate markets. The notion that PPPs can only 
be successfully deployed in geographical areas that 
exhibit significant real estate inflation seems to be 
disproved by several examples of successful STPs or 
Districts being created in smaller cities and regions 
where proper planning and identification of focus 
areas, building on local strengths, has occurred.
In many cases, new STPs/Districts are part of 
large-scale urban regeneration efforts and involve 
the repurposing of large-scale legacy infrastructure 
(i.e. HereEast and MIND). Instances exist of entirely 
“green field” developments (e.g. Gav Yam Negev 
and Ørestad Innovation City) that have managed to 
successfully grow thanks to long term investments 
driven by forward looking strategies, but these seem 
to remain exceptional cases. 
One of the fundamental roles of public partners 
involved in the conception of new STPs – and 
even more of new Innovation Districts – is to take 
full account of the connectivity and liveability 
elements of their projects. STPs and Districts that 
are integrated into broader local regeneration 
plans, benefit enormously from upgraded and newly 
developed transport links, amenities, educational, 
healthcare and sporting facilities, as well as from the 
availability of affordable housing. 
This emphasis on connectedness and liveability 
inevitably becomes a fundamental element of the 
attractiveness of an innovation district and will 
determine, in the long-term, its ability to attract the 
human and financial resources necessary for its growth 
and expansion.
Sectoral focus and specialisation 
Determining if a new STP/District should have a 
specific sectoral focus is an essential question. 
Careful identification of local industrial strengths 
and niches is a pre-requisite for any successful 
long-term PPP. Public authorities also have an 
important role to play leveraging their ability to 
locate anchor tenants on new STPs/Districts such as 
public universities or research centres operating in 
relevant domains (e.g. Gav Yam, Plexal).
The lengthy process of “profiling” to identify the 
industrial sectoral focus, and of assembling a 
network of industrial partners, can take (several) 
years to complete. But alignment with local industry 
and international demand is likely to significantly 
improve a project’s success likelihood. 
Smart specialisation strategies can also form an 
important starting point for administrations, be 
they local, regional or national, to identify strategic 
areas to focus on, in which existing or emerging 
comparative advantages exist. Adhering to local 
smart specialisation strategies would also enable 
local authorities to leverage EU funds for additional 
development of the local ecosystems. 
Stakeholders
Structured involvement and consultation of 
stakeholders throughout the planning and operation 
of an STP/District is of vital importance. Innovation 
ecosystems have complex and diverse value chains 
and planners may need to engage with constituencies 
as diverse as academics and researchers, institutional 
and early stage investors, bankers, civil society 
organisations, philanthropic institutions, successful 
entrepreneurs, etc.
JRC Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks
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The involvement in the planning and development of 
a new STP/District of all levels of governance (local, 
regional, national) is also essential, especially with 
respect to complex, large-scale projects. The MIND 
project, provides a best practice example in managing 
the involvement of different governance levels 
through the creation of AREXPO, a public company 
whose shareholders include the national government, 
the regional government, Milano Municipality, and 
three strategic local partners: the provincial authority, 
the local municipality and the Fair of Milan.
Governance
In the majority of observed cases, the public partners 
are usually not engaged in the management of 
day-to-day operations of the STP and/or Innovation 
District and, in a minority of cases, even their 
involvement in setting specific policies and strategies 
is minimal. Public Partners are generally consulted 
either through specific advisory bodies (i.e. Steering 
Committees) or represented in the board of directors 
of the STP/District, in cases where these are set-up 
through formal creation of a Joint Venture between 
public and private partners. 
Such arrangements are intended to achieve three 
objectives: (i) ensuring that the private partner 
has a great degree of latitude in developing and 
managing the infrastructure and – especially in the 
case of Innovation Districts – service provision to 
tenants, (ii) insulating Public Sector partners from 
the commercial risk of a particular project that is 
transferred to a private operator, and (iii) ensuring 
that the public partner retains a level of influence on 
strategic decision making.
Transferring risk to the private sector and administrative 
efficiency remain core factors behind the decision to 
form PPPs in connection with STPs and Innovation 
Districts. However, the quantification and management 
of commercial risks for these types of projects 
remain difficult for private sector players, especially if 
compared to more traditional real estate development. 
The flexibility of governance structures also seems 
to emerge as an important element. STPs and 
Innovation Districts are, by definition, dynamic 
projects that should remain open to newcomers that 
may want to jump-in at later stages of development 
depending on specific circumstances and needs. 
Balanced growth and expansion
Public sector partners generally relinquish control 
of significant real estate assets to private sector 
developers, managers, operators or tenants, while 
retaining, in a limited number of cases, only small 
amounts of surface space (e.g. 5,000 m2 of the 
75,000 m2 in total in Ljubljana). 
Partnerships between the public and private sector 
need to balance the inevitable tendency of private 
partners to focus on monetisation of the real estate, 
by aiming for high or full occupancy rates with the 
need to ensure that occupants have relevant profiles 
(bringing value to the composition of the cluster) and 
that adequate investments are made in laboratories, 
common areas and amenities. The latter three are 
particularly important, not just for an STP or District 
to enable the delivery of high-quality research (which 
is an essential part of its core mission), but also 
to ensure that a pleasant environment facilitating 
informal social interaction is created. Socialisation 
and the resulting cross-fertilisation are recognised 
as important pre-requisites for triggering the type 
of cross-organisational collaborations that are so 
essential to driving innovation. 
In many cases, additional buildings and 
infrastructures are added at later stages once the 
project matures, its viability is demonstrated, and 
private investors recognise its potential. In managing 
expansion, it is important to ensure continued quality 
monitoring of any potential new tenants to ensure 
that they can catalyse and accelerate the ecosystem 
further, by exploiting synergies with existing anchor 
institutions (e.g. universities and research centres) 
and tenants.
Occupants/tenants and services
Critical mass is absolutely essential for an STP or 
Innovation District to successfully get off the ground. 
The public sector has an important role to play in 
helping a project to reach the tipping point at which 
Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks JRC
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private investors become interested, by leveraging 
its control or influence over public or semi-public 
institutions (e.g. universities, research centres, public 
administration offices, hospitals). The decision to 
transfer to a new STP or District such significant 
anchor institutions increases the attractiveness of the 
project, often by relocating significant human capital 
to the premises. 
The process and criteria utilised for the selection 
of tenants is also significant. In most of the cases 
covered by this report, potential tenants have to 
undergo a stringent evaluation process intended to 
determine the nature and innovativeness of their 
activities, their potential for growth both locally and 
internationally, and their relevance to the STP/District. 
STP/District managers are often very selective in 
their screening of potential tenants and the use of 
selection committees, with broad representation is 
frequent. The length of contracts, leases, concessions, 
etc. has a strong impact on the amount of flexibility 
that private sector partners can apply to the selection 
of tenants. Longer contractual arrangements mean 
that break-even points can be projected further into 
the future and greater stringency applied to tenant 
selection even at the cost of lower occupancy rates in 
the short-term. 
The creation of a supportive environment, with 
broad ranging services provision, that amplifies 
the socio-economic impact of the research and 
innovation generated onsite, is a critical element of 
success. In many ways, the real estate infrastructure 
“hardware” cannot operate successfully unless it is 
complemented by appropriate “software” in the form 
of a plethora of support and ancillary services.
In particular, most STPs/Innovation Districts, 
especially when attracting significant populations of 
early stage and start-up companies need to provide 
adequate services and programmes to support their 
growth and expansion. The range of services and 
programmes in question is broad and varied and 
often includes the provision of suitable incubation 
facilities and related acceleration programmes (often 
run in collaboration with corporate sponsors) as 
well as advisory services (often in collaboration with 
external suppliers) related to, for example, identifying 
and protecting intellectual property, raising early 
stage investment, and advertising and marketing. 
All the above-listed support services, are frequently 
complemented by additional outreach activities, for 
example alumni programmes that have proven very 
beneficial in facilitating trust and connections building 
between the public and the private sector and 
between organisations inside the STP/District and the 
outside world (both Ann Arbor and Brno have good 
experiences with harnessing alumni networks). 
Proximity is valuable for companies and research 
institutions that are co-located on a particular 
site. But proximity among private actors is not the 
only benefit of an STP/District. In the case where 
particular sites attract significant numbers of 
people – or are embedded in urban and sub-urban 
areas – proximity to users and potential customers 
offers an important additional benefit in the form of 
the possibility of accessing large pools of potential 
users and customers for piloting of new solutions or 
technologies. Such an approach, commonly referred 
to as a living lab approach has gathered considerable 
momentum in recent years and is actively being 
implemented/explored in at least three of the cases 
covered (Johanneberg Science Park, Plexal and MIND).
Financing and budget 
Most of the examined STPs/Innovation Districts 
function (or intend to operate) on the basis of 
at least two differentiated revenue streams: (1) 
Their operational budget and (2) Revenue linked to 
externally funded projects or services provided. 
Operational costs are often covered though a mixture 
of private and public (local, regional or national 
authorities, universities, etc.) contributions. Additional 
sources of funding will typically include rents, private 
foundation sponsorships, consultancy, (non-rental) 
membership fees from public, private and academic 
tenants, innovation-related services to tenant 
companies, and competitive projects from national or 
EU programmes. 
Interesting, innovative and seemingly sustainable 
(financial) models that emerge from the analysis 
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include the use of a portion of capital gains tax 
proceeds on the real estate to support the growth 
and acceleration of technology start-ups (as in Ann 
Arbor). This generates a virtuous cycle as growing 
companies occupy vacant space, thereby generating 
real estate appreciation which in turn increases 
capital gains tax receipts. 
The major part of the surpluses from the operation 
of Science Parks and Innovation Districts are 
normally re-invested in the area to expand buildings, 
infrastructures or to broaden the range of services 
available to tenants. This in turn increases the 
attractiveness of the STP/District.
The distribution of dividends to the private partners is 
also practiced, especially in later stages of projects. 
Some STPs and Innovation Districts currently run 
surpluses but would need to raise additional private 
sector capital if they wanted to expand. 
One of the key challenges in the planning and 
conception of a new STP/Innovation District is the 
estimation and projection – often over very long 
periods of time – of future levels of revenue and 
profitability. The calculation of future proceeds 
of an STP/Innovation District is fundamental to 
demonstrate the commercial viability of a project 
to private sector partners. At the same time, 
overestimating potential revenues may compromise 
the viability of a project while underestimating 
them could trigger a loss of value for the public 
sector partner. 
Calculations and projections of these types need to 
be carefully undertaken on a case by case basis and 
constitute a key difficulty in the set-up of large-scale 
PPPs for STPs and Innovation Districts. 
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Performance measurement
The selection and measurements of key performance 
indicators for STPs and Innovation Districts operating 
as PPPs varies considerably between the cases 
covered by this study. 
Some projects try to identify and measure the level 
and intensity of collaborations and partnerships as 
reliable proxies of a functional innovation ecosystem. 
Others put the emphasis on tenants’ satisfaction, job 
creation or overall value added to the local economy. 
In all cases, however, a consensus exists that 
hard economic indicators may fail to capture the 
positive socio-economic externalities of an STP or 
Innovation District and that hard indicators need to be 
complemented by social impact indicators and metrics.
Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks JRC
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1. Introduction
As mentioned on the website of the Smart 
Specialisation platform5, ‘Smart Specialisation is 
conceived within the reformed Cohesion policy6 of the 
European Commission, and is a place-based approach 
characterised by the identification of strategic areas 
for intervention based both on the analysis of the 
strengths and potential of the economy and on an 
Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) with wide 
stakeholder involvement. It is outward-looking and 
embraces a broad view of innovation including but 
certainly not limited to technology-driven approaches, 
supported by effective monitoring mechanisms’…
‘Science and technology parks (STPs) and Innovation 
Districts are very common instruments used by 
regional and national authorities for regional 
development. Their main objective is to foster 
science-based growth poles to stimulate economic 
diversification away from declining industries. 
Today, STPs are present in many European regions. 
They concentrate a wide range of innovative 
companies and research organisations and as a 
consequence the overall knowledge intensity of these 
places is very high. STPs and Innovation Districts 
are thus likely to include seeds for the domains of 
knowledge-intensive specialisation, on which regions 
can rely to increase their competitiveness. This is why 
STPs and Innovation Districts seem well placed to 
play a key role in innovation strategies for smart 
specialisation (S3).’ 7, 8
However, there are barriers9 to effectively attract 
investment to build such STPs10 (cf. R&D&I 
infrastructures), including: 
• lack of finance for (i) operating expenses (OPEX) 
of infrastructures and (ii) development of a 
cross-sector innovation communities 
• political volatility resulting in shifting policy and 
funding priorities 
• limited institutional capacity in some Member 
States (largely due to high turnover of staff)
• pressure to maximise loan dispersion 
(or absorption in the case of grants) 
• political pressure to make projects 
self-sustainable from the very beginning
• slow pace of cultural change within universities 
and research institutions (especially in 
relation to collaboration with industry and 
commercialisation of R&D results)
• absence of robust financial models capturing the 
synergies between real estate and innovation 
components of these types of projects11.
To explore some of these challenges in greater detail, 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) organised a number of dedicated workshops 
focused on the different models of STP financing, 
management and operation. 
Against this background, the JRC’s Competence 
Centre on Technology Transfer12 (CC TT) was tasked 
in 2017-2018 with conducting a study on reshaping 
the capacity and development strategy of a newly 
built technology park in South-East Europe and 
improving its (financial) sustainability. One of the key 
recommendations emerging from this study was that a 
concession-based PPP should be set-up where a private 
sector partner would be responsible for additional 
development and operation of the park and for 
ensuring its sustainable expansion and growth.13 
The current study -undertaken by five external 
experts in close collaboration with the International 
Association of Science Parks and Areas of Innovation 
(IASP) and its vast network of Members- intends to 
build and substantiate the recommendation made in 
2018 and to explore how Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) and related partnering modalities, such as 
concessionary models, can best be utilised and applied 
for the construction and operation of (financially) 
sustainable Science and Technology Parks (STPs) and 
Innovation Districts. 
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The experts engaged for this study were of the opinion 
that a necessary preliminary step was to analyse 
currently existing STPs and Innovation Districts 
operating as PPPs, as a way of identifying relevant best 
practices. In so doing the experts decided to depart 
from the stringent OECD definition of Public Private 
Partnerships and to adopt a very broad definition 
covering many forms of public-private collaborations. 
The goal of this study was achieved through the 
analysis of several case studies14 covering several 
existing or emerging models for the development and 
operation of STPs and Innovation Districts. The focus 
has been placed on cases where long-term contractual 
arrangements are in place between public and private 
sector that go beyond the simple outsourcing of 
construction projects. While some of the cases explored 
in this study cannot be referred as true PPPs, they 
nonetheless represent best practice and successful 
examples of public and private sector coming together 
in the conception, construction and management of 
STPs and Innovation Districts. 
This study also introduces a broad spectrum of 
available models and considers overlaps, similarities 
and differences between them. It also sheds light on 
the ways in which cities apply innovative approaches to 
the design, financing, and delivery of large-scale urban 
regeneration projects (including the redevelopment of 
large-scale legacy sites) focused on R&D&I. 
Advantageously, this study can serve as a case-based 
reference guide for practitioners including developers 
and managers of STPs and Innovation Districts, 
policymakers and stakeholders.
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2. Methodology
This section describes the methodology used for the 
preparation of this study.
First, together with IASP and the experts, three 
general/broad models of collaboration between public 
and private partners with respect to Science and 
Technology Parks and Innovation Districts were identified.
Afterwards, a general survey was created and 
distributed to member organisations of IASP to 
determine whether they considered themselves to 
be/operate as PPPs, using the three collaboration 
models identified earlier. More specifically, respondents 
were asked whether their organisational structure was 
captured by any of the three broad categories/models: 
(1) Long-term partnership involving a degree of risk 
sharing (the closest to a traditional PPP); (2) Jump-in 
model where private investors are involved at a later 
stage of a project’s development; or (3) Management 
Partnership. These three broad scenarios do not aim 
to capture every possible scenario but were deemed 
adequate as a taxonomy for the purposes of this study. 
Additional permutations and hybrids of these models 
exist, but they can generally be reduced to the three 
baseline models described above. 
Application of these models can occur at different points 
in the lifecycle of a specific project. In some instances, 
for example, the initial and riskiest phase of a project 
is completed entirely by the public sector. In this case, 
an initial set of buildings and facilities is constructed 
by the public sector and initial operations are launched. 
Once the viability of the project is demonstrated 
a private partner(s) is/are identified and urbanised 
land15 is handed over for additional construction and 
development of the park, often through concessions 
covering the whole, or part, of the site. In many cases, 
the concessionary models used make provisions for 
the flow-back of a portion of the proceeds generated 
by operation of the park to the public authority that 
initiated the project. Such de-risking of a project by the 
public sector has proven extremely attractive to private 
investors that would not necessarily be prepared to cope 
with the volatility and uncertainty linked to a project at 
its very outset. 
Resulting the general survey results, respondents were 
distributed among the three groups mentioned above. 
Afterwards specific questionnaires were developed for 
each group (see Annex 1A, 1B and 1C respectively). 
The eight case studies covered in this report were 
prepared through in-depth interviews16 conducted by 
the experts and include projects identified as falling 
within group 1 as a result of the general survey or 
projects identified through desktop research and the 
networks and experience of individual experts. Most of 
the cases covered in Chapter V of this report come close 
to the traditional PPP model or resemble several of its 
elements. Information on Group 2 & 3 projects was 
collected through an online specific survey17 whereby 
the results analysed by the IASP team.
Figure 1. Methodology and steps in preparation
Resulting in the case studies provided in chapter 5
Personal interviews with senior management of 
group 1 STPs/AOI indentified through the general 
survey or other means
Following a consultation among experts, three models of organising public/private cooperation in Science and Technology Parks 
and Innovation Districts were identified as the most distinct providing coverage of the vast majority of possible scenarios
General Survey — Determines whether STP/AOI*
falls under models 1, 2 or 3 (resulting in three groups)
* See definitions below
Analysis and Final Report
Online specific survey targeting STPs/AOI 
falling in Groups 2 and 3
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3. Background
This chapter comprises five sections and provides 
background information to help set the scene and 
scope of the study. The first section provides an 
overview of relevant definitions used in this study. 
The second explores the nature of PPPs, especially in 
the EU context. The third looks at the financing and 
execution of PPPs. The fourth looks at the real estate 
market. The fifth and final section looks at State Aid 
implications of PPPs. 
3.1 Definitions
3.1.1 Definition of Science Parks and 
Areas of Innovation by IASP
Despite some overlaps, IASP differentiates between 
the concepts and respective definitions of a 
Science and Technology Park (STP) and an Areas of 
Innovation (AOI). 
The IASP definition of a Science and Technology Parks 
states that:
“A science park is an organisation managed by specialised professionals, whose main aim 
is to increase the wealth of its community by 
promoting the culture of innovation and the 
competitiveness of its associated businesses and 
knowledge-based institutions.
To enable these goals to be met, a Science 
Park stimulates and manages the flow of 
knowledge and technology amongst universities, 
R&D institutions, companies and markets; 
it facilitates the creation and growth of 
innovation-based companies through incubation 
and spin-off processes; and provides other 
value-added services together with high quality 
space and facilities.18 ”
The IASP definition of an Area of Innovation (AOI) 
states that:
“ 'Areas of Innovation' are places designed and curated to attract entrepreneurial-minded 
people, skilled talent, knowledge-intensive 
businesses and investments, by developing and 
combining a set of infrastructural, institutional, 
scientific, technological, educational and social 
assets, together with value added services, thus 
enhancing sustainable economic development and 
prosperity with and for the community.19 ”
3.1.2 Definition of an Innovation District
Innovation districts are related to science parks and 
areas of innovation as defined in the previous section. 
Large multi-stakeholder innovation districts, of which 
the current study examines several, seem a relatively 
recent development that has emerged alongside 
traditional science and technology parks. They are 
closely related to areas of innovation, of which they, 
effectively, seem to represent a sub-set. 
The Global Institute on Innovation Districts (GIID), a 
recently established platform gathering practitioners, 
non-governmental organisations, researchers, real 
estate investment funds and global infrastructure 
developers, defines innovation districts as: 
“dense, walkable hubs of economic activity where innovation, entrepreneurship, creativity, 
and place making intersect and where actors 
collaborate as a collective to increase their 
competitive potential.20 ”
A recent study21 focusing on how innovation districts 
are addressing economic and social divides claims 
that over 100 innovation district projects already 
exist across the world sharing three common traits:
On conceptual and impact level, the research 
finds that innovation districts are used as a tool 
for “inclusive innovation” to ensure that local 
Figure 2. Common traits of Innovation Districts and asset creation 
Creating• Density
• Proximity and
• Accessibility
Three types of added value
• Physical
• Economic
• Networking assets
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communities also benefit from the economic and 
educational opportunities that they generate. 
This approach is commonly referred to as 
“responsible neighbourhood regeneration”.22
The GIID is partnering with the Brookings Institution, 
an independent think tank based in Washington, DC. 
Brookings finds that innovation districts “build on 
and revalue the intrinsic qualities of cities: proximity, 
density, authenticity, and vibrant places”23 and 
recognises the potential of innovation districts to act 
as catalyst of urban regeneration.
One of the key findings of this study is the 
importance of thorough planning for the success 
of innovation district projects. The initial inception 
and evaluation phase of each large-scale project is 
essential for its long-term success and sustainability. 
This phase usually requires an in-depth assessment 
of the area’s potential including its value chains, 
even where these extend beyond the geographical 
boundaries of a particular area. Such assessment 
tends to focus on three core asset types: economic, 
physical and networking (connecting) assets, and 
comprise an analysis of:
• the clearly distinctive or unique features of 
a particular area
• its sectoral focus and strengths 
• the commercialisation potential of local 
university and company R&D24
A study by the Brookings Institution suggests that 
cities are starting to realise that they can capitalise 
on radically undervalued and underleveraged assets 
in their [public] possession. This applies not just to 
wealthy metropolises, but also to poorer or indebted 
cities that often sit on significant assets – such 
as public land – that are not being utilised well 
or developed.25
3.1.3 Definition of a Public-Private Partnership
PPPs tend to be diverse and unique animals and their 
complexity is well captured by the mantra among experts: 
“when you’ve seen one Public-Private Partnership, you’ve 
seen one Public-Private Partnership”.26
No single widely accepted definition of a PPP, or 
uniformly and internationally recognised one, exists. 
PPPs include a variety of long-term contractual 
arrangements. 
According to most definitions, including the one used by 
Eurostat, only projects that bundle together construction 
and operation are considered to be true PPPs. 
The PPP Knowledge Lab27, of which both the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are partners, 
brings together relevant and authoritative resources 
on PPPs in one location, to assist governments and 
practitioners to design and deliver better infrastructure 
projects. It was launched in 2015 by a number of 
Multilateral Development Banks with the support from 
the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF, 
a multi-donor technical assistance facility).28 The PPP 
Knowledge Lab aims to provide reliable, trustworthy 
knowledge about Public-Private Partnerships. The 
Reference Guide of the PPP Knowledge Lab provides a 
broad definition of a PPP:
“A long-term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a public 
asset or service, in which the private party bears 
significant risk and management responsibility 
and remuneration is linked to performance. 29 ”
The European PPP Expertise Centre based at the 
EIB has the objective of supporting the public sector 
across Europe in delivering better public-private 
partnerships (PPPs).
The European PPP Expertise Centre uses a definition 
similar to the one above, but specifies that in PPP 
arrangements the public authority either makes 
performance-based payments to the private partner 
for the provision of the service; or grants the private 
partner a right to generate revenues from the 
provision of the service.30
PPPs typically share the following features, 
according to the European PPP Expertise Centre:
• based on a long-term contract; 
• are between a public authority and a private partner; 
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• focus on the provision of services 
rather than assets;
• entail the transfer of certain project risks to 
the private partner, notably with regard to 
designing, building, operating/maintaining 
and/or financing the project;
• focus on the specification of project outputs 
rather than project inputs, taking account of the 
whole life cycle of the project;
• apply private financing (often “project finance”) 
to underpin the risks transferred to the private 
partner; and
• remunerate the private partners, either through 
performance-based payments for the provision of 
the service, or through the right to generate revenues 
themselves from the provision of the service.
The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) recognises that in many developing 
countries and emerging markets, governments have 
made PPPs a priority. The UNECE International PPP 
Centre of Excellence (ICoE) has been created to 
explore good practices of international PPP projects 
and to assist governments in implementing such 
projects. According to its Guidebook on Promoting 
Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships,31 
the Centre identifies two broad categories of PPPs: 
“institutional” PPPs referring to all forms of joint 
ventures between public and private stakeholders and 
“contractual” PPPs, consisting in the use of concession 
models (the ‘user pays’). The latter has experienced a 
strong surge in popularity in the recent past.
The definition proposed by the OECD states that PPPs 
are “long-term contractual arrangements between 
the government and a private partner whereby the 
latter delivers and funds public services using a 
capital asset, sharing the associated risks”.32
The 2012 OECD recommendations on the governance 
of PPPs also provide a good overview of the principles 
that public authorities should consider before 
entering into PPPs, including “value-for-money”.
The effectiveness of the alignment of public and 
private interests depends also on a sufficient and 
appropriate transfer of risk to the private partners. 
In a typical PPP contract, the government specifies 
the quality and quantity of the service it requires 
from the private partner. The private partner may 
also be completely entrusted with the design, 
construction, financing, operation and management 
of a capital asset required for service delivery as well 
as the delivery of a service to the government, or to 
the public, using that asset. 
In the cases of large-scale innovation districts where 
numerous stakeholders are involved, projects tend to 
be conceptualised in close cooperation between public 
and private partners to a process very much akin to 
co-creation, within the applicable legal framework and 
regime for the respective type of contracts. 
This goes well beyond traditional public procurement 
of construction work and points towards intricate 
and highly structured concessionary models involving 
extensive liaison and negotiation between public and 
private partners. 
Traditional public procurement for construction differs 
from more complex concessionary or partnership 
structures in that the role of the private party goes 
beyond the one-off real estate construction, adding 
the right and obligation to operate and exploit 
the area for the shared benefit of the public and 
private stakeholders. In these circumstances, a 
long-term shared vision about the development and 
management of the area is an important precondition 
for success. Negotiations between public and 
private sectors in this context can be lengthy and 
complex and public sector partners are often at a 
disadvantage when it comes to skills and expertise, 
especially on questions relating to valuations and 
revenue modelling. 
Figure 3. Alignment of interests
AlignmentService delivery objectives of the government 
Profit of the private 
company partner(Public partners)
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For the purposes of this study, we adopt a broad 
definition of PPPs, including not just the structured 
forms of cooperation covered above but also looser 
forms of collaboration among the public and private 
sector in the planning, delivery and operation of STPs 
or Innovation Districts.
3.2 PPPs in the broader sense
3.2.1 PPP Concessions in the EU context 
“Concession” is one of the most commonly used 
words, and probably the least precise one, in PPP 
terminology.33 The vagueness and frequent usage 
of the word concession makes comparison of 
projects across countries and sectors more difficult 
as similar projects often use different terminologies 
and different ones the same, even if referring to 
different concepts.34 
Eurostat35 makes a useful differentiation between 
PPPs and concessions. PPPs require that a 
government entity is the direct source of the majority 
of the revenues that the [private] partner is entitled to 
receive under the contract. This is the case regardless 
of whether the demand for or use of the asset 
originates from the government entity itself (e.g. 
a hospital paid for by a government entity) or from 
users (e.g. a road, paid for by a government entity on 
a demand (toll) basis). If the majority of the private 
partner’s revenue is sourced directly from the users 
of the asset, Eurostat will consider the project to be 
a concession. Member States of the EU may have 
different or more specific national definitions of a PPP. 
According to the UNECE 2008 Guidebook on Promoting 
Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships, 
concessionary models have the longest history of 
public-private financing and are actually a form of PPPs. 
Concessions are defined as contractual arrangements 
whereby a facility is given by the public to the 
private sector, which then operates it for a certain 
period of time. This often includes the design 
and construction of the facility as well. Contracts 
foreseeing extensive involvement of the private sector 
(i.e. “Design, Build, Finance and Operate” (DBFO) are 
considered concessions.
Concessions allow for the mobilisation of private 
capital, know-how and expertise to complement 
public resources (such as land for instance) and 
enable new investment in public infrastructure 
and services without increasing public debt. The 
EU Concessions Directive (2014/23/EU) applies to 
contracts whose value is equal to or greater than 
€ 5 225 000. Concessions can be either for works or 
for services, as illustrated below:
• For works concessions the contracting authorities 
or contracting entities (i.e. acting on behalf of the 
public sector) entrust the execution of works to 
one or more economic operators, who in turn are 
awarded the right to exploit the works with or 
without additional payment.
• For services concessions, the public entity 
entrusts the provision and management of 
services to one or more economic operators, 
who in turn are awarded the right to exploit the 
services with or without additional payment.
An essential element of concessions is the transfer of 
[operating] risk to the private partner (the main risk 
being that the revenues generated do not cover the 
private partner’s overall investment). The EU Directive 
assumes the existence of such a risk for the purposes 
of defining a “concession” (Article 5): 
“ […] The concessionaire shall be deemed to assume operating risk where, under normal 
operating conditions, it is not guaranteed to 
recoup the investments made or the costs incurred 
in operating the works or the services which are 
the subject-matter of the concession. The part 
of the risk transferred to the concessionaire 
shall involve real exposure to the vagaries of the 
market, such that any potential estimated loss 
incurred by the concessionaire shall not be merely 
nominal or negligible. ” 
In principle a project is financially viable for the 
private partner if the revenues generated by 
operating or exploiting the project’s assets cover not 
only the full costs for the investor but also provide 
a sufficient return on investment. The complexity 
of PPPs implemented through concessionary 
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arrangements lies in striking a balance between the 
necessary amount of investment, the risks of the 
project and the economic and social benefits of the 
project for both the public and private sector. 36
Duration is a key element in any concessionary 
arrangement. Article 18 of the Directive stipulates that: 
“…the maximum duration of the concession shall not exceed the time that a concessionaire 
could reasonably be expected to take to recoup 
the investments made in operating the works or 
services together with a return on invested capital 
taking into account the investments required to 
achieve the specific contractual objectives. ” 
An essential principle for concessions is that users 
will pay for services or use of the infrastructure 
throughout the lifetime of the project. In the case of 
innovation districts, the users will be the businesses 
and tenants that pay rents. Ultimately, therefore, it is 
the users that generate the revenues that the private 
partner (concessionaire) needs to recover the costs of 
building and operating the facilities.
Simple land-lease contracts may also be used for 
the development of STPs and Innovation Districts. 
However, these do not qualify as concessions 
and therefore legislation on concessions does not 
typically apply. 
Mixed contracts containing elements of supply, works 
and service contracts and of concessions may be 
fully or partially covered by EU Directive 2014/24/EU 
on public procurement.
3.2.2 Benefits and downsides of Public-
Private Partnerships
The PPP model offers significant advantages over 
traditional public procurement for construction in 
terms of efficiency, service quality, value for money 
and above all the existence of a shared long-term 
vision between the public and the private partner. 
The Commission, in its Guidelines for Successful 
Public-Private Partnerships37, has identified 
four primary functions for the private sector in 
PPP schemes:
• to provide additional capital;
• to provide alternative management and 
implementation skills;
• to provide added value to the consumer and the 
public at large;
• to provide better identification of needs and 
optimal use of resources.
In short, PPPs bring savings to the public purse and 
improve the quality and efficiency of public spending 
by leveraging the expertise and know-how of the 
private partners, ultimately helping to align public 
and private interests.
The provision of equity or debt finance by the private 
sector partner explicitly builds a mechanism for 
managing the costs and risks associated with PPP. This is 
in stark contrast to direct public sector funding where 
risks are ultimately transferred to taxpayers or end users.
Risk identification, quantification and allocation is 
at the core of any PPP. A clear understanding of 
what risks are allocated or transferred and to whom 
is a precondition for the drafting of every PPP or 
concessionary agreement. The appropriate application 
of risk allocation principles is what determines 
whether a given PPP project will be ‘bankable’, and 
whether it will be sustainable. A useful reference in 
this respect is provided by the report “Allocating Risks 
in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts”38 that 
provides methodological indications on how to map 
the allocation of risks between public and private 
sectors in PPP transactions, as well as information on 
possible mitigating strategies.
The complexity of PPPs have led some to question 
their effectiveness and efficiency beyond the initial 
construction phase, with questions raised about their 
long-term cost for the public sector.39 However, recent 
studies, focusing on emerging innovation ecosystem 
models, find that PPPs for Innovation Districts are 
capable of combining the market efficiency with the 
benefits of public direction, support and legitimacy.40 
A report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
found that delays, cost increases and underuse were 
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partly attributable to inadequate ex-ante analyses 
and unsuitable approaches. The institutional and legal 
framework was assessed as not sufficiently adequate 
for EU supported PPP projects and a number of PPP 
projects were not able to generate their expected 
benefits. Risk allocation was also found to be often 
inadequate, resulting in reduced attractiveness or 
excessive risk exposure for private partners.41 
An additional ECA report covering the effectiveness 
of EU funding provided to start-up incubators and 
related infrastructures (often a key ingredient of STPs 
and Innovation Districts) found that infrastructure 
quality was generally good, but that the support 
services offered to end users tended to be poor.
At the Member State level, management systems did 
not pay sufficient attention to the operational activity 
of business incubators. Financial sustainability 
could also have been better addressed. The ECA 
recommended that the following elements be 
incorporated in the design of the procedures for 
selecting and supervising EU co-financed projects: 
“ In the project selection criteria, greater emphasis should be placed on the expected results 
of the projects rather than on the delivery of 
physical outputs…. During the project assessment 
process and when contractual obligations are 
being defined, more use should be made of expert 
knowledge of business incubation activities…42 ”
3.3 Project financing 
and execution of PPPs
Several financing models are available for PPPs. 
One of the basic models is the 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) where the 
private partner builds, owns and operates the 
assets or facilities. At the end of the project lifetime 
and after a previously agreed and specified period 
of time, the private partner is obliged to return 
(transfer) the assets (such as land and/or buildings) 
back to the public partner. In permutations of this 
model, the private partner may never truly own the 
assets but just operate them (BOT). Another model 
is the design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF), 
traditionally used for public hospitals for example. 
In table 1, we compare traditional public procurement 
for one-off construction of a publicly owned and 
publicly managed project against a scenario in which 
the private sector is involved in almost all stages 
of the project: from the inception (proposal of the 
solution) through to the construction, continuous 
investment, operation and management, all the 
way to the long-term “right to use” the area under a 
concessionary contract. 
Mixed public-private ownership is observed in about 
30% of STPs in the EU.43 A number of these operate 
under models that lie somewhere between the two 
extremes illustrated in table 1.
Source: Based on Brookings Institute analysis and expert interviews
Table 1. Compare: Levels of Private Sector Engagement
Identify 
Infrastructure 
Need
Propose 
Solutions
Project 
Design
Project 
Financing Construction
Operation / 
Maintenance Ownership
Traditional 
Procurement 
for 
Construction
(no PPP)
Public Sector
Private Sector 
(One–off 
development)
Public Sector
Complex, long 
term & far 
reaching PPP 
with strong 
private sector 
involvement
(clear PPP/
concession)
Public Sector Public + Private
Co–creation
Private Sector
Operation + Continuous Investments / Usage 
& 
Deriving Profits, Concessionary elements
Private Partners 
often become 
co-owners. In 
concessions: 
"ownership" 
or the right to 
use is limited 
in time.
Private Sector Partners
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STP investments at the EIB
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has co-financed 
the development of several science parks across 
Europe, typically with about 50% participation in the 
total project costs.
The Bank performs a holistic evaluation of projects it 
considers for funding,44 this is commonly referred to 
as “appraisal”. This due diligence process involves an 
assessment of the financial viability of the project, 
an analysis of risks and related mitigation strategies, 
the counterparty’s capability to operate the project, 
market dynamics, etc. In addition, in order to be 
eligible, projects should contribute to EU economic 
policy objectives such as the promotion of economic 
and social cohesion in the EU. 
The table below compares the appraisal approaches 
taken by a hypothetical private investor and by the EIB 
to a fictitious infrastructure project, called ‘Project X’.
Table 2. Compare: approach to potential investment
Project X Private investor's approach to potential investment EIB's approach to potential investment
Evaluation
Project is considered viable 
if an acceptabler risk/return 
profile is offered.45 
Economic appraisal takes a broader view to include 
other societal benefits and the value generated for 
all stakeholders
Degree of interest 
from the respective 
investor 
Interested to invest only on 
reasonable economic terms 
(considering the risks, etc.)
While financial profitability and return is required for 
a project to be funded, lower financial returns do not 
necessarily mean lower economic and social impact.
From an institutional investor’s point of view, portfolio 
diversification has an important role to play in 
making investments with limited financial returns but 
generating significant positive societal externalities.46 
“ By combining different types of projects and fostering synergies between investments, 
a diversified portfolio that gives good financial 
returns on some projects can compensate for 
(cross-subsidise) poor financial returns of other 
projects, which nevertheless achieve good 
Non-Financial Impacts. ” 47 
Canada: Emerging models for 
bridging infrastructure finance
A new initiative of USD 35 billion offers a model 
that uses state support to attract private sector and 
institutional investment to new revenue-generating 
infrastructure projects that are of public interest. 
The Canada Infrastructure Bank48 seeks to address 
a gap in the market between government-funded 
infrastructures, procured traditionally or as a 
public-private partnership, and projects that are 
privately funded.
Ukraine: Incentivising private investors 
in countries with limited resources
A review of policy and institutional frameworks 
for industrial parks in the Ukraine discovered 
several mechanisms where countries with limited 
state resources attempt to attract private real 
estate investors and incentivise them to achieve 
government objectives. 
The paper49 covers a number of examples of 
developing countries trying to establish PPPs and 
attract private investors. In Chile, for example, the 
government provided guarantees (in the form of a 
minimum income) to increase the financial viability 
of proposed PPP projects.
China invests heavily in integrated science 
parks and science cities infrastructures
China is making significant investments in integrated 
R&D&I infrastructures. Tus-Holdings50 is an S&T 
investment holdings group linked to Tsinghua 
University. Tus-Holdings develops and operates 
science parks, business incubation centres and 
technology research and development facilities. 
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It offers intelligence and financial services, including 
venture capital investment.51 The network of 
Tus-Holdings covers more than 50 cities and regions, 
including Hong Kong, the US, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Egypt, Italy, UK, Russia, etc., and is an 
important new actor of China’s innovation system.52
TusPark is responsible for the construction of 
innovation and entrepreneurship services system. 
TusPark has the world’s largest science park network 
with 5 completed parks around China with an area 
of 5 million square meters and 15 million square 
metres park area under development according 
to their website. Their parks host more than 3000 
companies. TusPark (Beijing) is one of their largest 
holdings and is a single university science park, with 
a built area of 770,000 square metres, and more 
than 1000 resident companies. It has become an 
important platform for Tsinghua University to serve 
local society and promote the “brand” internally as 
well as internationally. 
Tus-City has adopted a model focus on integrating 
urban development with innovation ecosystems. For 
example, Tus (Hefei) is a multi-functional integrated 
science and technology park set up by Tsinghua 
University, the provincial government of Anhui and 
the Hefei municipal government. It has a planned 
floor space of 1.7 million square metres.
Tus-Incubator is one of the earliest and largest 
networks of incubators in China comprising 150 
facilities. Many Tus incubators are supported by 
the government that provides the space, covers 
operational fees, and sets up the cooperation fund 
with Tus-Holdings. Tus-Holdings provide the team 
and knowledge necessary to operate the facilities. 
The BOO (Build-Own-Operate) model appears to 
be the prevailing model in Chinese cities. For the 
purposes of an investment a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) is normally created with public and private 
participation (such as 80% private / 20% public). 
The government pays for services to finance the 
build-up phase of an SPV project (reducing the risk). 
At the end of the development phase there is an 
initial public offering (IPO) repaying the investors. 
Tus-Holdings is also expanding abroad, for instance 
with a participation in the large-scale Tushino project 
in Moscow. Tus-Holdings entered into a consortium 
together with the Russian Direct Investment Fund 
to co-invest, alongside with sovereign wealth funds 
from other countries, in the redevelopment and 
repurposing of the former Tushino airfield in Moscow 
turning it into a major multifunctional STP. This would 
turn it into the largest innovation centre in Russia. 
The total investment will exceed 90 billion Russian 
Rubles. The project includes plans to also build 
residential and recreational facilities.53
3.4 Significance of the real estate 
market
Large scale infrastructure projects are often complex 
and numerous factors need to be considered when 
thinking about their financing.
One of these factors is the size and strength of 
the regional or local real estate market. Public 
sector asset owners such as regional governments 
or local municipalities often wish to support 
and incentivise the development of an STP or 
Innovation Area/District by making land available 
and expecting that magic should happen. However, 
and well beyond a government’s ability to position 
on a site important anchor institutions or attract 
international corporations, the buoyancy of the local 
real estate market will have a significant impact 
on the attractiveness of a particular project for 
private investors. 
In weak real estate markets with strong public policy 
ambitions and support, public intervention can have a 
catalysing effect for the development of the project. 
This is especially the case where the public sector 
invests in the conceptualisation of developments or in 
improving the connectivity or a particular area or site.
When the local real estate market is reasonably 
strong, attracting private investors is considerably 
easier and higher demand means that tenant 
selection can be more stringent (e.g. application of 
sectoral preferences, or demand for R&D intensive 
tenants only). 
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In other words, the surrounding environment 
influences the potential for and development of 
a science park or innovation district. In overheated 
real estate markets, private investors can drive the 
process, while in a location with flat demand more 
active public intervention is needed (see figure below).
Figure 4. The Real Estate Market
Location is also important, in particular whether 
the area is located in a densely populated urban, 
suburban or entirely rural area. There seems to be 
a consensus that the tendency is to locate STPs in 
immediate proximity to a city or even within the city 
boundaries, taking advantage of urbanisation benefits 
while revitalising often marginalised communities in 
urban suburbs.
3.5 PPPs and State Aid 
in the EU context1
The EIB 2016 report54 on PPPs and state aid provides 
an overview of the relevance and application of state 
aid principles to PPPs. 
An important consideration is that all possible state 
aid issues must be addressed at the very early stage 
of project preparation (and certainly before any 
transfer of public land or assets), in order to avoid 
later stage difficulties.
A general principle and requirement is to avoid 
distorting the market by over-compensating the 
private partner in PPP arrangements or otherwise 
providing undue or discriminatory benefits. 
This can be ensured by running fair and transparent 
public procurement processes while, for instance, 
charging a risk-adjusted price for the provision of 
any state guarantees offered to PPP projects. 
1 This section is intended to be a very simplified introduction on the subject-matter and nothing herein can in any way be considered as 
an interpretation of the applicable rules and regulations.
The price agreed with the private partner must be 
fair and not give undue advantage. In commercial 
decisions, such as the sale or leasing of land, the 
public partner must strive to act in the same way as 
any market operator would and seek to extract the 
best value based on a market price or arm’s length 
negotiations. In other words, the procuring authority 
(usually the public partner) should act as a “Market 
Economy Operator”. 
There are cases in which the private partner is 
given the right to use land for symbolic amounts in 
exchange for the provision of certain services as part 
of the PPP. In such situations, the “peppercorn” rents 
cannot be considered in isolation for the purpose of 
state aid assessment, but the rent must instead be 
assessed as part of the wider package of rights and 
obligations of the private partner. Exceptions apply, 
including the ones contained in the General Block 
Exemption Regulation55 (GBER). As a whole, state 
aid considerations should duly incorporate a feasible 
mechanism for monitoring the various benefits 
accrued by the private partner so as to ensure 
compliance with any financial or other thresholds 
established in view of a GBER exception. 
Another relevant element of EU state aid legislation 
is the possibility for a private investor to benefit from 
preferential access under more favourable conditions 
to research infrastructures or the premises, facilities 
and activities of an innovation cluster, provided that 
the private partner has financed at least 10% of the 
investment costs. In order to avoid overcompensation, 
such access shall be proportional to the partner 
undertaking’s contribution to the investment costs 
and these conditions shall be made publicly available 
(Article 26 and Article 27 GBER).
Flat Moderate OverheatedStrong
Real Estate Market
Public Sector Promoter Real Estate Investor
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Often, for complex, long-term PPPs, such as innovation 
districts, the type of procedure for selection of the 
private partner could be a “competitive dialogue”. 
This procedure was designed mainly for procuring 
PPPs and economic infrastructure projects.56 
The competitive dialogue and the more recent 
“competitive procedure with negotiation” allow 
dialogue/negotiation with economic operators where 
the awarding body is not totally sure about the best 
way of realising its objectives.57 As opposed to the 
“Open Procedure”, these are not first resort procedures 
and there are a number of limitations and conditions 
for their use. Article 26 of EU Directive 2014/24/EU58 
on public procurement provides that competitive 
procedures with negotiation or competitive dialogues 
can only be used in specific situations where the 
following criteria are fulfilled: 
• the needs of the contracting authority cannot 
be met without adaptation of readily available 
solutions; and/or 
• the works, supplies or services include design or 
innovative solutions; and/or
• the contract cannot be awarded without prior 
negotiations because of specific circumstances 
related to the nature, the complexity or the legal 
and financial make-up or because of the risks 
related to them; and/or
• the technical specifications cannot be 
established with sufficient precision […] 
The competitive procedure with negotiation or 
competitive dialogue may also be used where, 
in response to an open or a restricted procedure, 
only irregular or unacceptable tenders are submitted.
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4. IASP questionnaires and results: PPP
models identified and how these are used
As described in chapter 2, this study was initiated 
with the preparation and distribution of a general 
survey among IASP members and partner projects. 
The aim was to identify which of these have been 
created as, or are managed as, PPPs. The survey also 
intended to determine which of three models/types 
of public private collaboration each project entailed: 
(1) a close long-term PPP involving a degree of risk
sharing (the closest to a typical PPP of the three
models); (2) a Jump-in model where private investors
enter the partnership at a later stage of development
or (3) Management Partnership.
These three PPP models will be described in this 
chapter and a summary of the survey results will 
be presented (whereby a complete overview of all 
survey results for group 2 and group 3 are contained 
in Annex 2A and 2B respectively).
4.1 Description of the three 
main PPP models 
4.1.1 Model 1: “Full Partnership model”
Under this model the public partner(s) and one (or 
more) private partners reach an agreement to jointly 
build or exploit an STP/District. The definition of 
public partner covers different levels of governance 
(national, regional, and municipal) as well as 
government agencies, but also public universities, 
banks etc. The parties involved in the agreement will 
agree on the percentage stakes that each will have in 
the project. 
Typically, this model entails the whole construction 
or redevelopment of a site, where little infrastructure 
exists and where there are no operational facilities. 
The parties agree on the governance model, the 
management, the strategy, mission and other 
important aspects that need to be decided upon 
before the initiation of the project.
Regardless of the distribution of “ownership” which 
can vary, the most significant feature of this model 
is that the partnership is formed before the project 
is launched or in its very early stages, and all parties 
in the partnership define together the mission, goals 
and strategy of the project. Typically, the parties 
involved will create an intermediary organisation in 
charge of owning, building and managing the project.
This is an emerging model and usually involves a 
concessionary type of contract for the development 
of mixed-use areas. One example of this is the 
Milan Innovation District (MIND) (see the case study 
number 8). 
4.1.2 Model 2: “JUMP IN” PPP model
Under this model an STP or Innovation District is 
launched on the exclusive initiative of a public 
agent (city, region, etc.), as is the case for most STPs/
Districts. After a variable period of time, the owners 
of the park decide that the project should open for 
private investors to jump-in so that it can continue to 
develop and grow. 
In these cases, private investors are invited to 
undertake additional development of a site through 
the construction of infrastructure (office buildings, 
dry labs, workshops, co-working spaces, etc.) or 
through the provision of value-added services such 
as private incubators, accelerators, etc. They are free 
to commercially exploit the facilities or services that 
they make available and they are not necessarily 
integrated into the management structure of the 
STP or innovation district and do not participate in 
strategic management decisions. 
Carefully designed agreement between the owners of 
the park (public) and those ‘jumping in’ (private) are 
of critical importance. The private investors need to 
agree to the general policies of the STP, in particular 
the criteria for company/tenant admission and the 
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right of the owners to a veto on various matters 
including tenant admission. 
The main reason for use of this type of PPP model is 
for the public owners to attract additional investment 
to an STP/District in order to fully develop its 
potential without the investment of additional public 
resources. 
The attraction of the private sector to a site also has 
significant promotional value as it sends positive 
signals to the broader market. 
In some cases, some STPs offer to resident 
companies the possibility of buying office space or 
land to build their own premises. In this case, said 
companies, technically become investors in the park. 
For the purposes of this study, we focus on private 
investors that develop additional infrastructure or 
provide services and do not consider investments 
made by STP resident companies.
4.1.3 Model 3: “Management partnership”
Under this model one or more public agents launch 
an STP/District, of which they are the owners. 
They also decide that managing the operation of 
such a project would better be outsourced to a 
private company providing the necessary experience 
and expertise.
The public partner and private operator reach an 
agreement detailing the responsibilities of each 
party, their respective competences, levels of 
decision-making, the business models, remuneration 
that the management company is entitled to, the length 
of the agreement, performance monitoring metrics, etc. 
The private company responsible for managing the 
park, programmes and services will generally not invest 
money in the construction of premises or facilities, 
although exceptions exist in which management 
companies own some premises on the site. 
In most cases, the managing company invests in 
the conception and delivery of services that the STP 
provides to its residents, frequently including not just 
maintenance and up-keeping services but also high 
value-added services like incubation and acceleration. 
4.2 Results
4.2.1 General survey results — Private investments 
in STPs and AOIs
The first general survey was conducted in February 
2019 and sent to all IASP Full and Affiliate members 
(283 STPs/AOIs from 75 countries) and a few 
non-members. It consisted of the following main 
question on the applicability of the three broad 
models: Has your STP or area of innovation (also 
referred to as innovation district) been created as a
result of a collaboration between the public and 
private sectors, in any one of the following 3 models?
Table 3. Three broad models for public-private collaboration for the development of STPs and AOIs 
MODEL 1:
PPP
PPP often refers to projects with a strong collaboration between public and private and a 
significant risk sharing of the private partner. The definition as proposed by OECD: “long term 
contractual arrangements between the government and a private partner whereby the latter 
delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks”.
MODEL 2:
Jump–in 
Model or late 
stage private 
investement
The park or district is launched and owned by a public agent. At a certain point, private investors 
are given the opportunity to develop some elements of the park and exploit these. In most cases 
the private investors build offices and/or workshop space to rent it out to tenants. 
MODEL 3:
Management 
partnership
The park or district is promoted, launched and owned by the public sector but the owners 
outsource the management of the project to a private company, or invite the private sector to 
participate (with capital increase or other forms of contribution) in the management company of 
the STP, or take over the management entirely. The responsibilities, risks and profits of the parties 
are fixed by a negotiation between the public and the private partners.
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Fifty eight replies were received from organisations 
in 35 countries, whereby 14 of the respondents 
answered that their organisations do not operate 
through any of the three models described above. 
This resulted in a sample of 44 organisations that 
recognise themselves as PPPs of one type or another. 
Of the 44, 36% selected Model 1 (16 organisations 
from 14 countries; China, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Egypt, India, Iran, Italy, Kosovo*2, Mexico, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA), 
32% chose Model 2 (14 organisations from 10 
countries; Botswana, Canada, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Iran, Korea, Morocco, Spain and United Kingdom) 
and 32% chose Model 3 (14 organisations from 
12 countries; Austria, China, Colombia, Greece, Iran, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, 
Turkey and United Kingdom):
The 16 STPs/AoIs that selected Model 1, also were 
asked two short sub-questions in the framework 
of the general survey, which related to (i) the 
percentage of the private sector participating in the 
partnership and (ii) the stage when the partnership 
was established. Of the 14 respondents, over 70% 
indicated private sector ownership of over 30% and at 
least 35% indicated majority private sector ownership:
*2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 
declaration of independence
The majority (75%) of STPs/AOIs operating under 
model 1 stated that this was established from the 
very beginning of the project’s lifetime when the 
STP/AoI was launched, as illustrated below:
Some of the 16 respondents, that were identified as 
operating as a model 1 PPP, were then selected for 
case studies and interviewed (using the questionnaire 
in Annex 1A as a guideline, of which results are 
provided in Chapter 5 of this report).
Figure #: PPP Models in STPs/AOIs
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Figure 5. PPP Models in STPs/AOIs
Source: IASP 2019
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Figure 6. Percentage of private sector in the partnership
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Figure 7. How the PPP scheme was organised
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4.2.2 Specific online survey results 
of groups 2 & 3
MODEL 2: “JUMP-IN” PPP MODEL 
A second, more detailed online survey59, was later sent 
to 16 organisations from eight countries (Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, South Korea, 
Spain and United Kingdom) which were identified as 
belonging to group 2. Eight organisations from six 
countries (Botswana, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, South 
Korea and Spain) replied to the questionnaire. 
Details of these 8 organisations are contained in 
the table 4.
The second survey results indicate that for model 2, 
the park/area development typically starts as a 
public initiative, and later on, private investors are 
given the opportunity to get more involved (like e.g. 
given the opportunity to develop some elements 
of the park and exploit these). For example one 
park was managed by a public body (cf. a Regional 
Development Agency), and as they were only able to 
sell plots, and the market demanded buildings (offices 
and workshops), they collaborated with private 
investors, which undertook the necessary construction 
of buildings and offered the premises for rent.
The survey respondents also defined which 
components of the STP/AOI/Innovation District were 
created through a PPP investment60:
According to the management of surveyed areas, 
75% of respondents indicated that the interest 
from private partner investors in the real estate 
development of the STP/AOI was greater compared to 
locations outside the STP/AOI. 
Further, the role of each partner in different phases of 
the PPP project was evaluated. The results indicated 
that in most cases the private investors’ role is either 
to build several buildings or to actually deliver the full 
construction (normally through standard procurement 
procedures). Considerable variations exist within 
the sample with the public and private partners 
collaborating more or less actively to all phases of 
the project. In some cases, the public partner led the 
planning exercise and left construction to the private 
Year of Creation Built area ( m2 ) Number of resident 
companies
Numer of employees 
working
% foreseen of 
Private investors
% foreseen for 
Public Partner
1991 4,200,000 1,100 18,000 65% 35%
2012 36,000 199 850 80% 20%
2003 70,000 100 2,000 10% 50%
2000 235,000 168 4,000 70% 30%
1991 150,000 140 2,400 5% 95%
1992 400,000 630 19,970 70% 30%
2016 40,000 28 450 30% 70%
2003 100,000 400 4,500 65% 35%
Source: IASP 2019
Table 4. List of organisations which considered Model 2 as applicable: "JUMP-IN" partnership
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Figure 8. Components of STPs/AOIs created 
through a PPP investment
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sector, in other cases the involvement of the public 
sector included supervision of construction work and 
in others, the private sector was partially involved 
even in the planning phase. 
In the case where the private investors buy or lease 
land with long-term contracts from the public partner, 
the question was asked if the public partner was 
free to spend these funds on their financial and/or 
development goals. A great majority of the public 
partners said they are free to spend the funds as 
they see fit, while some indicated that they had 
to transfer the sales proceeds to the public owner 
(e.g. the regional government, which in many cases 
seems to have given the permission to reinvest the 
revenues into further development of the parks’ 
infrastructure). 
In the case where the private investors buy or lease 
land with long-term contracts from the pubic partner 
(for their own development purposes), 88% of the 
respondents said that the usage profile for this 
land was restricted (e.g. industry, tech, start-up,…), 
however 12% posed no restriction towards the 
private partner. The type of control STP/AOI managers 
exercise over the type of companies that private 
investors attract can be divided into two main 
categories: (i) 75% of STPs/AOIs can veto proposed 
tenant companies, if they don’t meet the general 
admission criteria, while (ii) 25% of private investors 
can bring companies at their full discretion. 
In most cases (75%) the private partner/investor 
was allowed to stay indefinitely (in other words 
the land/buildings were sold), whereas 25% of the 
survey respondents indicated the private partner was 
granted a time-limited lease/concession to use the 
land/buildings. 
When asked what penalties were for private partners 
that did not deliver on contractually agreed upon 
obligations, respondents pointed to a number of 
remedies at their disposal, including legal action, the 
application of financial penalties as contractually laid 
down or the exercise of rights of withdrawal.
Risks and mitigation strategies were also covered. In 
particular, the risk of tenant companies not meeting 
the necessary specifications was significant for 
several respondents with mitigation strategies raging 
from increased cooperation with the private partner 
in company selection, to the delivery of negative 
feedback to relevant government authorities. The 
risk of low land parcels uptake by developers was 
addressed by leveraging special economic zone 
incentives and through aggressive promotion and the 
risk of sub-par construction or delayed construction is 
frequently addressed through land clawback clauses 
in contracts. 
Fifty percent of the survey respondents were 
convinced that the economic viability/sustainability 
of the STP/AOI without the real estate contribution 
from private partner investors was possible, while 
twenty-five percent thought that projects would 
remain viable, but that services provision would 
need to be significantly reduced. The remaining 25% 
considered private sector investment essential61.
MODEL 3: “MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP MODEL”
A specific questionnaire62 was also sent to 15 
organisations identified as operating under model 
3 covering 12 countries (Austria, China, Colombia, 
Greece, Iran, Portugal Romania, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom). 
Four organisations from 3 countries (Austria, China 
and Turkey) responded. Due to this very limited 
sample size, the answers should serve only as a 
possible indication.
The survey respondents confirmed that in their case 
the STP/AOI management has been transferred to 
a private management organisation. In some cases, 
the private company in question is publicly owned. 
For example, some of the projects have a private 
sector representative in their Board of Directors 
Year of 
Creation
Built area 
( m2 )
Number of 
companies
Number of 
employees
2002 372,000 260 3,900
2005 34,000 70 1,300
2006 7,000 78 596
1994 770,000 1,000 35,000
Table 5. List of organisations which considered the 
Management Partnership model as applicable
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(BoD), or in Steering Committees. Organisations 
that serve as representatives can be for instance 
an exporters’ union or industrial zone managers. 
In other cases, affiliates are shareholders in the park 
management company, which can in turn be a limited 
liability company. 
Three out of the four STP/AOIs also stated that there 
is a financial contribution in the form of equity by 
the private partners in the management company 
of the STP/AOI. Half of the respondents indicated 
that the public sector has a majority of seats in the 
BoD. For the other 50%, the reverse is true. The CEO 
is typically appointed by the BoD or the majority 
shareholder (such as the university). 
The respondents highlighted the following priorities 
and financing modalities for continued operation and 
expansion: 
• Use of own resources and loans 
• Increase rental turnover and occupancy rate, 
construction of new buildings and rental space 
• Rental income, projects, grants, and services as 
key revenue streams 
In the majority of cases the Private Operator Company 
is allowed to manage the assets of the public STP/AOI. 
However, this remains subject to the supervision 
of the Board of Directors. In overseeing the private 
sector operator, the Public Partner ensures that 
public interests are safeguarded through a variety of 
supervisory practices including regular audits.
The following KPI’s were identified, to monitor project 
implementation: 
• Occupancy rate 
• Total revenue, 
• Resident companies’ turnover and exports 
• Annual gross profit and its growth rate,
• IPRs generation
• Rate of innovation
• Number of graduated incubator companies
• Number of facilities 
• Created added value 
• Positive media coverage and customer reviews
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5. Case studies based on personal 
interviews with managers of STPs 
and Innovation Districts 
Following the identification of projects that fall within 
the three categories of the IASP survey described 
in the previous chapter, eight specific STP and 
innovation district projects (including but not limited 
to the STPs/Districts identified as a result of the 
general IASP survey) of interest which follow model 1 
were selected to function as case studies: 
1. Ørestad Innovation City, Copenhagen, Denmark
2. Here East & Plexal, London, United Kingdom
3. Johanneberg Science Park, Gothenburg, Sweden
4. Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park, 
Be’er-Sheva, Israel
5. Technology Park Brno, Czech Republic
6. Technology Park Ljubljana, Slovenia
7. Ann Arbor SPARK, Michigan, USA
8. Milan Innovation District (MIND), Milan, Italy
The personal interviews with selected science park 
or innovation district managers were conducted by 
four independent experts (Filippo Addarii, Hardy 
Schmitz, Paris Kokorotsikos and Robert Bush) 
between April and July 2019, where for each 
selected STP/Innovation District following four broad 
categories of questions were covered (which is 
somewhat reflected in the structure of provided case 
studies): (1) Institutional set up and Partnership, 
(2) Contribution of each PPP partner, (3) Role of PPP 
partners in the management and at operation of the 
STP/District and (4) ex-post view of the PPP venture. 
A full list of questions that was used as a basis for 
the interviews are provided in Annex 1.A. 
The length of the case studies varies due to several 
factors. To mention one, this is for instance the 
complexity of the MIND project, which is still at an 
early stage, but which envisages a very particular 
99 year-long concession. It must be clearly stated 
however that all case studies are equally valuable 
and important for the purposes of this study. All 
case studies have been checked for their quality and 
completeness and all respective experts have been 
asked to provide clarifications. Where necessary, the 
interviewed managers have also been contacted to 
provide further information and/or clarifications. 
The sequence of presentation tries to reflect as much 
as possible the homogeneity and continuity, and to 
an extent it also tries to serve as a cross-comparison. 
The order of presentation is to aid the flow of 
content; no preference is reflected.
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5.1 Case study: Ørestad Innovation City, Copenhagen, Denmark
Based on an interview with Carolina Benjaminsen, CEO
Fast Facts: Ørestad Innovation City
Country Denmark
City Ørestad, Copenhagen
City population 21,000 inhabitants, 20.000 students and 20,000 work in the area. 
The Copenhagen Metropolitan Area has approx. 2 million population.
Year of creation The city part: 2000 – ongoing;
The Innovation District: 2017 - ongoing
Area / Built area When fully realised 3,100,000 m2
Main sectors The building environment, Hospitality, Education, Technology and Tech start-ups
Number of companies 39
Number of employees 20,000 work in the area (see above). The organisation itself has three full time 
employess and two student helpers.
Website https://en.oicc.dk/
Figure 9. Ørestad South in year 2000
© Ørestad Innovation City Copenhagen 
Figure 10. Ørestad South in year 2019
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5.1.1 Institutional Set-Up and Partnership
Ørestad Innovation City is a new Innovation District 
located in Copenhagen’s Ørestad neighbourhood, in 
the southern part of the city. It was established in 
2017 through a PPP involving partners belonging to 
both the state, private and academic sectors. Ørestad 
Innovation City is an emergent Innovation District 
and was established in a completely new city area 
only 2 km away from City Hall and 8 minutes’ drive 
from the main Nordic airport. To give an impression 
of the size and scale the area is about 5 km x 600 
m or 3.1million sq. m. with a coefficient of intensity 
for the construction 1.063 meaning that in practice 
3.1.m. sq. m. floor space can be built. Not long ago 
the area was a green field, but in the last decade, 
developments have grown significantly with a focus 
on sustainability of urban solutions. And now, the 
area holds the necessary critical mass of people to 
enable the formation of an Innovation District, with 
20 thousand students, 21 thousand workers and 21 
thousand inhabitants. All numbers that are expected 
to grow significantly over the next couple of years.
According to real estate data both years since the 
formation of Ørestad Innovation City (2017 and 
2018) have been positive years in Denmark, and 
also in general terms the country was (and is at 
the time of writing) experiencing a recovery from 
the economic crisis, partially driven by the national 
and regional focus on sustainability and the green 
economy. The main motivation for establishing 
the Innovation District was to tap into the physical 
capital that was being developed in the area by 
creating the intangible infrastructure necessary 
to produce innovation, growth and liveability. 
Nevertheless, Ørestad Innovation City does not 
solely focus on the development of ancillary services 
but initiates projects where individual actors from 
academia, private and public sector cannot easily 
identify the existence of cross-sectoral synergies 
and opportunities. 
The rationales behind the choice of a PPP were mainly 
risk sharing and administrative efficiency – by lowering 
the distance between private and public actors the 
project was aiming at creating mutual advantages 
to all partners involved. The initiative came from 
Copenhagen City and Port Development Corporation, 
a publicly owned, privately run organisation tasked 
among others with the development of Ørestad and 
therefore interested in making it a success. Shortly 
after, private partners and universities started to take 
an interest in the project, with members64 (academic, 
public and private partner organisations) rising from 
the initial 14 to 40 in just two years. While the risk 
was initially perceived as a question of whether or not 
the time was right for an initiative like that, now that 
the project has proved initially successful, the main 
challenge will be to reach innovation levels that will 
make it attractive for other private and public partners 
to join in and relocate to the area.
Beside the City and Port Development Corporation 
the other public partners at the moment are two 
large universities (Copenhagen and Aalborg), a high 
school, the waste and water authority, the public 
transport agency, a national television and radio, 
and a multitude of private organisation, including 
major Nordic real estate, private equity and pension 
funds such as Solstra, ATP, KLP and NREP. The 
pension funds involved in the Innovation District are 
developing part of the physical assets of the area, 
which gives them long-term interests in the area 
in general. Real estate developers are involved in 
a similar way as all other members, including the 
pension funds. Being part of Ørestad Innovation City 
enables them to make it an attractive area known 
for its ability to connect people and organizations, 
drive innovation across sectors, and nurture liveability 
aspects beyond their own buildings. Currently no 
business associations/chambers of commerce are 
involved in the project.
5.1.2 Contribution of each PPP Partner
Since Ørestad is already a part of Copenhagen, albeit 
in the process of further development, the core mission 
of the District in this case is not to support the creation 
of physical assets, but rather that of intangible, 
network assets that connect what is already there. 
The development of Ørestad started about 20 year 
ago by placing a metro line in a green field area, 
allowing then subsequently to develop the area. The 
financial model behind this way of developing urban 
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areas is described by Bruce Katz as The Copenhagen 
Model65 whereby the solution entails, among others, 
the transfer of vast amounts of public land to a new 
publicly owned, privately managed corporation: 
“The Copenhagen model works because the public sector participates for the long term, 
reaping enormous benefits as value naturally 
appreciates from smart public investments. 
It combines the efficiency of market discipline 
and mechanisms with the benefits of public 
direction, legitimacy and low-cost finance.66”
The Ørestad Innovation City partnership is built 
around a rather lean legal form based on an 
expression of interest in the development of the 
District. By becoming part of the professional in the 
Innovation District, which is coordinated by a not for 
profit organisation, each partner (member) takes 
part in the development of Ørestad and is granted 
access to services aimed at improving the way they 
operate, such as matching with other entities and 
more generally maturing their projects. Other services 
available for start-ups and larger corporate members 
include access to networks, conferences, participation 
in project groups as well as being part of the 
common branding (visibility) of the area. 
Ownership is divided between tenants, with a small 
fraction belonging to the City and Port Development 
Corporation. The Corporation financed the major part 
of starting-up the Ørestad Innovation City whereas 
at the moment the funding is rather more equally 
split (50-50 public and private) and despite having a 
member base of mostly private firms (approx. 80%). 
The District is managed by a Board of representatives 
from the members with a specific composition: out 
of the 10 members of the board, four to seven must 
come from the private sector, one to four must come 
from the public sector, and one to four must come 
from the educational sector.
5.1.3 Role of PPP Partners in the management 
and Operation of the Science Park
The operational costs of Ørestad Innovation City 
are shared as follow: a little more than one third is 
provided by the City and Port Development Corporation, 
and the rest is split between the remaining public 
partners and the private ones (whereas the terms 
for membership for tenant companies are the same 
as for the real estate developers). Contributions to 
funding the operations are directed from the different 
members to the coordinating organisation by means 
of a membership fee. Members are normally located 
within the Innovation City area with Ørestad being the 
"epicentre", however universities and companies with 
long term interests in Ørestad can join the ØICC too. 
Offices in Ørestad can also be rented without becoming 
a member. The membership fee varies depending on 
how many employees the organisation has, in order to 
make it easy for small companies and start-ups to join 
as well. The fee starts from DKK 5000 annually (which 
is less than EUR 700) for start-ups and organisations 
with up to five employees and can reach up to 
about the equitant of EUR 20000 annually for large 
companies with more than 500 employees. You can 
find more information on the specific business model 
on the official website of the ØICC.67
The strategy of the Innovation District is set by the 
Board, who nevertheless nurtures a participatory 
approach from all partners. By opening the 
decision-making process, in fact, the Board aims 
at creating a strong engagement from all partners. 
This is an element which is deemed necessary in 
order to enable the district’s structure to an extent 
that is conducive of innovation and growth. Ørestad 
Innovation City’s strategy is aligned with the national 
and regional strategies and singles out the very 
specific advantages of joining in, starting from the 
fact that being a new part of the city there is no 
preconceived idea of what should become of the 
area. Currently, the Innovation District is generating 
a surplus, which nevertheless would not be possible 
without the real estate component. The district’s 
budget comes from different sources, the main 
ones being the membership fees and in some cases 
tenancy rents. Normally the Ørestad Innovation City 
does not get payments for rent as these go directly 
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to the owners of buildings. The Innovation District 
is also aiming to generate income through projects 
that are initiated by partners and catalysed through 
the network infrastructure set up by the district. 
According to the legal form under which Ørestad 
Innovation City was funded, the district cannot run 
a deficit, and would be forced to cease its activities 
before incurring in one. The district has been 
growing its membership base at a fast pace since 
its inception, but it is now facing the challenge of 
keeping attracting the best organisations in terms 
of innovation potential. The more Ørestad matures, 
the harder it becomes for it to seek new high value 
innovators in the region. This translates into the 
need to look at the global arena for players that are 
interested in investing in Copenhagen. Being a mixed 
neighbourhood, with no possibility to establish large 
industry production sites, Ørestad will continue to 
look for knowledge intensive organisation, with a 
focus on seizing the opportunities that derive from a 
strong relationship between university and business.
5.1.4 Ex-post view of the PPP Venture
Although the Innovation District is of fairly new 
construction, it is possible to have a first glimpse at 
the ex post evaluation of Ørestad Innovation City. The 
main KPI that has been monitored thus far concerns 
the enabling of a better and stronger economy 
for the organisation, looking at the number and 
quality of members attracted, and building a robust 
and trust driven relation among members of the 
Innovation District. At the same time, there has been 
an interest in monitoring the level of collaboration 
that has been enabled by the Innovation District 
project, looking for example at the number of other 
innovative public-private partnerships that were 
created. The theme of sustainability in modern cities 
also lies at the heart of Ørestad Innovation City. 
This leads to a specific focus on the areas of traffic 
management (working towards making cities less 
dependent on cars), and social sustainability within 
buildings (an approach to office space allocation 
based on generational shuffling that allows to create 
a more innovation-prone environment). Among the 
lessons learned in the first months of operations 
there has been the positive reaction from the top 
tier management within the member organisations, 
who has demonstrated great interest in the project. 
At the same time, it will be important for the future 
to identify the correct approach to filter down in the 
management chain in order to get a hold on the right 
people that allow to tap into the full extent of the 
organisations’ innovation potential.
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5.2 Case study: Here East & Plexal, London, United Kingdom
Based on an interview with Gavin Poole, CEO, and Mike Magan, COO of Here East-Plexal Innovation District
Fast Facts: Here East and Plexal
Country United Kingdom
City London
City population City: 9 million 
Metropolitan Area: 14 million 
Year of creation 2012 (established after a tender)
Area / Built area Campus: 1,200,000 sqft in total of premises;
Building of Plexal: 80,000 sqft
Main sectors Creative and emerging technologies, mobility, AI, healthtech, cybersecurity, 
fintech, the Internet of Things.
Number of companies 150 start-ups in Plexal;
20 larger businesses in the premises of the bigger buildings 
Number of employees Here East is hosting in total 4000 people, out of whom 1000 students. 
Approx. 700 people are employed in the start-up building.
Website https://hereeast.com/, https://www.plexal.com/
Figure 11. "Here East, former Olympic International Broadcast Centre"
“Here East, former Olympic International Broadcast Centre” by Sludge G, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0.
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5.2.1 Institutional Set Up and Partnership
Here East (www.hereeast.com) is a brand new 
Innovation District in East London, at Stratford, in the 
wider area of London 2012 Olympic Games venue. 
It was established after a PPP tender in 2012, for 
transforming the Olympic Games Press and Broadcast 
Centre Area and Buildings, into an Innovation District, 
with special purpose buildings serving innovation, 
start-up entrepreneurship in creative and emerging 
technologies, R&D and tertiary education.
The project aimed not only to capitalize on expensive 
infrastructure, that had become idle after the 
Olympics, but also to have an impact on the wider 
Hackney Community, related to employment and 
education and to serve as a regional regeneration 
vehicle, based on vibrant, technology sectors.
The tender provided that the Public Body (Landlord 
is the London Legacy Development Corporation/ 
reporting to Mayor of London office) will lease the 
space and buildings for 200 years, while the private 
partner will in turn invest GBP 150 million to refurbish 
the existing buildings (70% of current infrastructure) 
and to add premises according to a plan, that would 
lead to the creation of London’s and one of Europe’s 
biggest Innovation Districts. The successful bidder 
(based on both quantitative and strategic/qualitative 
criteria), Delancey, a Real Estate Funds advisory group, 
backed by funds like DV4, started immediately works 
in the existing buildings. While some tenants were 
already in place as from 2013, the iconic, start-up 
innovation building, branded as PLEXAL, commenced 
operation in October 2016.
There is just one partner in the Management Company 
of Here East Innovation District - the Private Investor 
Delancey, which has been the same throughout all 
stages of development. The Landlord, which provided 
the 200 years leasing contract, had no other financial 
contribution to the project than the real estate but has 
been continuously consulted during the planning and 
construction phase.
5.2.2 Contribution of each PPP Partner
The Here East Innovation District was formed with 
a rather classical PPP procedure, where the public 
partner contributed the land, mandated the scope 
of the project and the private partner following an 
agreement on a common vision, invested GBP 150 
million for refurbishment, adaptations and initial 
operation costs till break-even of the Management 
Company. The company was set for operating the 
infrastructure, and in addition also to set up the Here 
East Innovation Ecosystem, with several intangible 
important services to innovative tenants, start-ups, 
SMEs, big companies and university departments 
moving there.
The shares of the Management Company belong 
100% to the investor. The private partner is 100% 
responsible for covering any deficit from the operation 
(as happened in the initial operating years) as well as 
with commercial risks of the project.
Additional projects that were created in the district, 
outside of the initial PPP contract, and which were 
funded by the public sector include the GBP 13 million 
Cybersecurity Innovation Centre. These projects were 
attracted through competitive procedures.
In addition to the socioeconomic impacts the public 
sector benefits also indirectly from the increased 
assets value around the Here East Innovation District. 
5.2.3 Role of PPP Partners in the management 
and operation of the Innovation District 
The policies and strategies of Here East and 
the specialised substructures such as Plexal 
(www.plexal.com) are developed by the management 
team, the landlord (public partner) having no 
institutional involvement in that. However, the 
management team is constantly in close cooperation 
and consultancy with all relevant London City 
Departments (Foreign Direct Investments Dept.) as 
well as relevant government departments at central 
level (Dept. of Transport, Health, Work and Pension, 
even the strategy team of Downing Street No10/the 
Prime Minister’s office), adjusting strategy and projects, 
according to the local/municipal and national 
innovation-related opportunities and priorities.
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Any surplus generated by Here East following 
investment repayment, will be used for expanding 
current infrastructure, alongside to the distribution 
of dividends to investors.
Although Here East is operationally a fully private 
venture, its management team is very selective when 
it comes to tenants. They interview candidate tenants 
and evaluate their business, or future businesses of 
start-ups, in terms of sector dynamics and relevance 
to sectors focused by Here East, and the potential 
of businesses to grow globally and became serious 
scale-ups.
Thus, the content of business is much more important, 
than the need to fill the space with rent paying 
tenants. The long-term lease gives the management 
team (which has quite a clear vision) the freedom to 
deliver results, according to the business plan of Here 
East, without making compromises on initial strategy.
5.2.4 Ex-post view of the public-private venture
Although Here East Innovation District is a rather 
new venture, significant successes have already 
been recorded.
The management team implements a business plan 
with KPIs for letting and jobs creation.
The Campus has 1,200,000 sqft in total of premises 
out of which 80,000 sqft correspond to the building of 
the start-up focused Innovation Centre Plexal (mainly 
in form open space hot desks and small offices, 
further 130.000 sqft are occupied by University and 
College departments and the rest is mix of offices, 
studios and high ceiling spaces for special purposes. 
Companies of all sizes occupy from 10 – 10,000 sqft 
space. The three main building are the Press Centre, 
the Broadcast Centre, and the Theatre (conference 
venue), encompassing the beautifully landscaped 
open area named The Yard. The buildings offer flexible 
working space, with large open floors, retail units, 
large-scale studios, including active television studios 
supported by a state-of-the-art data centre and lots 
of space where start-ups can develop and grow. 
Today there are 150 start-ups in Plexal, 20 larger 
businesses in the premises of the bigger buildings 
described above, which also host several departments 
of London Colleges and Universities. Here East is 
hosting in total 4000 people, out of whom 1000 
students (60-70 PhDs) and close to 700 are those 
employed in the start-up building.
As with other Innovation and Technology Parks, the 
qualitative criteria are also important, alongside 
numerical achievements. SMEs are attracted to Here 
East with a scope of improving and growing their 
business, by osmosis with innovation and knowledge 
developers present in the Innovation District.
Start-ups are attracted also, by the very 
well-designed conducive environment for innovation 
and entrepreneurship. In addition, individuals and 
companies, outside of Here East are attracted to 
the knowledge and entrepreneurship events taking 
place there.
The managers of Here East were invited to comment 
on their experiences and potential advice they could 
give to other STP/Innovation District developers 
(although it is clearly quite early for an ex post 
evaluation).
Their opinion on the applicability of the PPP model 
for/in STPs and Innovation District is, that it is difficult 
to develop a triple “P” strictly based on financial 
and technical parameters, without a shared vision. 
Significant communication is needed, among the 
partners and stakeholders, who should collaboratively 
develop this vision.
In their case a big percentage of the partnership 
proposal scoring, during the evaluation, was based on 
the vision and strategy for the buildings, alongside the 
technical and financial capability. Thus, the vision was 
proposed, agreed and approved by each side during 
that bidding process.
Classical PPP approaches placing emphasis on 
financial and technical criteria, availability payments, 
structure etc., are not suitable for Innovation Projects 
where vision is equally (or even more-) important. 
Thus, such PPPs could exploit the Here East example 
where vision was on par with financial and technical 
aspects of the tender.
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5.3 Case study: Johanneberg Science Park, Gothenburg, Sweden
Based on an interview with Mats Bergh, CEO
Fast Facts: Johanneberg Science Park
Country Sweden
City Gothenburg
City population 1 million (metro area)
Year of creation 2010
Area / Built area When fully realised 27,000 m2
Main technology sectors Urban development, Energy, Materials
Number of companies 17
Number of employees 23
Website www.johannebergsciencepark.com 
Figure 12. The district of Johanneberg Science Park located inside the campus area of Chalmers University of Technology
© Johanneberg Science Park
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5.3.1 Questions regarding the institutional 
set up of the partnership 
The Park (www.johannebergsciencepark.com) was 
formally launched January 2010 but was not fully 
operational until summer 2011. The year-and-a-
half was used to recruit a team, identify additional 
partners including Real Estate Developers. The initial 
sponsors were Chalmers University of Technology, 
the only private technical university in Sweden, 
based in Gothenburg and the City of Gothenburg. 
There remained uncertainty about whether private 
industry was going to see the value of the Park. The 
year-and-a-half was spent interacting with industry, 
while the first sponsors became also the park's 
"ambassadors". At present, the form of the science 
park is a joint venture between the city, the university 
and a number of private companies (originally, the 
venture was 50/50 shared between the university 
and the city). 
The key mission of the Park is to focus on sustainable 
urban development as well as energy systems and 
basic materials development. The period of profiling 
to identify these fields took about 10-15 years. A 
network was built of national private partners in 
Sweden from across these sectors of industry. Issues 
to be addressed include optimising city transportation 
systems, reducing social inequality. The location of 
the park is itself urban, central in the city and close to 
the university. 
At the time of creation, the economy was fine, and 
the project was not borne out of a crisis. There was 
an existing science and technology park which was 
already fully occupied with tenants so that there 
seemed to be surplus unmet demand for additional 
facilities. This was combined with a strong need 
for more knowledge in how to develop the major 
Swedish cities as cities of the future in particular 
from an environmental perspective. The challenges 
are complex, and a range of different entities are 
needed to address those. The primary rationale 
for forming a PPP was the need to bring together 
the different types of stakeholders from academia, 
private sector/industry, and government in order to 
fulfil the mission. 
The PPP was formed via a handshake between 
the Chairman of Chalmers University and the City 
Mayor of Gothenburg. At present the legal form is 
a not-for-profit limited partnership through a joint 
venture. The partners include Chalmers University 
of Technology, the only private technical university 
in Sweden (owned by a foundation), two Cities 
(Gothenburg and Mölndal aiming to develop also 
a city network), two local real estate development 
companies for the physical environment at the side, 
one national real estate developer able to replicate 
the good practices, knowledge and experience 
gained to other cities across the country, several 
industrial partners including some of the largest and 
internationally renowned Swedish corporations. 
Regarding funding for science park activities, the 
University and the City have slightly different 
needs and approaches. The University does 
traditional fundraising in particular research areas 
requiring either more academic knowledge or the 
transformation of already existing knowledge into 
innovation and for whose commercialisation it 
relies on the network of private industrial partners 
and tenants of the science park. The City is mostly 
interested and contributes to the development of 
particular products aiming to improve the urban 
planning process and the infrastructure and 
transportation system, making them more accessible 
with the ultimate view to reduce social inequalities. 
The process of co-creation of solutions for the needs 
of the city is related to the concept of a living lab. 
Johanneberg Science Park together with the city aim 
to develop projects that use on occasion [parts of] the 
city as a living lab / test bed for future solutions.
Four processes are central to the park: creating a 
network of partners, creating collaboration projects, 
communicating the results - sharing the knowledge 
and developing the infrastructure (buildings, labs, etc.). 
The fourth process of the physical development of 
the science park area is entrusted to the real estate 
investors, which generally retain the ownership over the 
facilities. The park management serves as a facilitator 
for these processes, having the role of a network 
collaboration partner for the real estate developers, 
for which service the park receives a set fee.
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The biggest risk at the inception phase was probably 
getting the support of the real estate development 
partners. At the initial formation, neither the City 
nor the University had committed physical assets 
to the Project. The Park team was responsible for 
programming activities including identifying the 
urbanisation challenges to focus on, outreach and 
communication activities including building the 
network of industry partners.
The PPP Partners were involved in all phases of the 
park project development, including private equity. 
In the beginning, the focus was to bring industry 
into the Park as an equity partner buying equity in 
the company. However, the length and complexity 
of the negotiations would require Board of Directors 
approval. So, the model switched (developed) to 
partnership instead of ownership. Currently both 
models are used, and the park is in the process of 
evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of 
these two models including from a legal point of 
view. This is also relevant for the allocation of the 
IPR created, which at the moment this is regulated at 
the level of product contracts, while the science park 
itself does not take equity for this IPR. This is also a 
topic that is currently in discussion.
As to the contributions of each partner, the University 
provided access to the academic research and 
scholarship. The private partners provided funding 
in the form of equity. The real estate developers 
(experienced university campus developer in 
Sweden) provided access to land necessary for the 
physical extension of the park (mainly parking lots). 
They retained ownership over this land, while the 
University retained the right to be offered first the 
possibility to buy it in case it is to be sold in the 
future. Thus, if a real estate partner wishes to sell real 
estate assets that are being used by Park members, 
Chalmers has the right of first refusal. 
Industry would pay rent or lease facilities as well as 
provide guidance for the types of research it required 
to drive commercialisation of R&D from the University. 
Initially, the Park negotiated a percentage of the rental 
income but moved to a monthly flat fee in order to have 
more predictable and stable cash flow. Additionally, 
the Park develops projects which are eligible for state 
and development bank funding. The relationship 
with industry is largely based on partnerships around 
specific projects (where the private partners supply 
expertise for these R&D projects for instance on product 
development) as well as a membership model not 
based on an equity ownership model. 
Regarding the funding for the operational costs 
for the (non-product-related) activities of the 
science park, approx. 60% comes from the public 
organisations/ authorities, while 40% is provided by 
the private partners. The Municipality as well as the 
University are providing the funding in the form of 
a set fee (amount is equal for both). This fee has 
not changed since the inception of the project. The 
park would however need more resources for its 
expansion. The park also has a partnership with the 
Regional Development Organisation for West Sweden, 
which has doubled the funding for operational costs 
throughout the years. 
Public financing is also provided through national 
R&D collaboration projects. Thus, the park receives 
funding for implementing specific projects, part 
of which funding can be and actually is used to 
develop the operations of the science park itself. 
Specific public funding is available to develop SME 
innovations. Lump sum payments were causing asset 
liability mismatches. Now payments are provided on 
a throughout the year basis.
Without the real estate development partners, the 
park would still be economically viable. However, 
the impact would not be as good without the 
environment created such as labs, high quality 
office spaces, meetings spaces and other physical 
infrastructure that the real estate component 
brings to the Park. The environment is seen as very 
important by the park management not only for 
socialising, but also as an important incentive for 
attracting industry tenants.
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5.3.2 Questions regarding the role of the PPP 
partners in the management and operation 
of the science park/AOI/Innovation District 
The Board consists of 14 regular members: nine 
from industry, two from municipalities, two from 
the University and one Chairman. The Board 
meets four to five times per year. There are 
several subcommittees including a Finance 
Committee, Strategy Committee and a Partnership 
Development Committee.
There are two classes of shares. The A Series 
consists of the City of Gothenburg and the Chalmers 
University. They are the original founders of the 
Park. The B Series consists of the private and other 
stakeholders. The Series A holders consider the 
long-term development objectives of the Park. 
The Series B have a more immediate focus.
The science park strategy is to an extent aligned 
with the smart specialisation strategy in the scope 
of sustainable community development. In the West 
Region of Sweden there are six Science Parks. 
There is some collaboration and also some overlap 
in scope and mission.
For the operations of the science park, looking mostly 
at the economic/technical aspects, the not-for-profit 
Park generates an intentional negative balance every 
year in order to not create a tax liability for its equity 
owners. Additionally, the possible generation of direct 
profits for the park (such as from the IPR, etc.) needs 
to be managed in full compliance with state aid rules.
Regarding the strategy for selection and admission 
of future tenants to park premises, the primary 
objective is to identify tenants that are high potential 
innovators. The real estate developer has the right to 
fill the space with any tenant if an innovative tenant 
cannot be identified. There has not been a problem 
filling the Park with the targeted tenants, however. 
There is regular communication and consultation 
between the PPP partners (incl. clearly the real estate 
developer) on this.
Additionally, because of the programming and real 
estate options of Johanneberg Science Park, the 
older Science Park in Gothenburg is able to offer 
complementary services to its existing tenants 
through an active collaboration. 
The Johanneberg Science Park is a member of the 
Chamber of Commerce allowing access to more 
companies and in that way to extend its network. 
Occasionally, they jointly hold events.
5.3.3 Questions regarding the ex-post 
view of this PPP venture 
The following main factors serve to measure the 
impact of the park activities: 
• Network growth
• Joint collaboration projects
• Social media reach
• Event attendees 
As regards the experiences and lessons learned 
since the inception of the park, its management 
has learned how to deal with the timelines, political 
agendas and processes of political organisations.
An STP shall allow members and stakeholders 
to demonstrate success on terms that matter to 
them. For example, the industry members and 
academia seek commercialisation successes. So, 
the Park creates as many opportunities to develop 
innovations important to them. Furthermore, the 
Park also generates added value by giving traditional 
real estate developers access to the best academic 
research available which they could then apply 
and use for their development and operations. This 
way, the science park could be seen as a "training 
camp" for growth and innovative development 
for businesses. This means that the real estate 
developers and their sub-contractors and partners 
are in a way willing to operate [often within the 
framework of various projects] as pilot customers for 
technologies developed in the park. 
The University does not really have a traditional 
TTO offering. The University supports its faculty and 
students through incubation types of initiatives, 
however. It is worthy to note that in Sweden 
individual researchers own their own research results. 
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The University has no claims to the IP developed by 
the researcher at the University. The provision of a 
TTO offering would thus have less of a priority. 
Following the first few years of operation the park 
gained considerable commercial traction and the 
interest of potential tenants increased. 
There are collaborations and projects that the 
Park has helped facilitate. In case of projects that 
create commercial traction, the Park is not an equity 
participant; it does not have significant transparency 
on what projects have had commercial success and 
it does not exploit patents or data that might be 
generated through its collaborations. However, the 
Park is generally aware that its Partners and members 
see commercial benefit from collaborations that the 
Park helps facilitate. In this regard and despite the 
fact that nothing concrete has been decided yet, the 
Park is generally considering how to participate in the 
commercial success of some of these collaborations. 
It is exploring ways in which it could generate 
additional revenue streams, particularly with regards 
to energy systems, for instance.
The Park does not directly own any real estate. 
The private partner real estate developers own almost 
100% of the real estate that is accessed through the 
Park. Chalmers has the benefit of having two main 
campuses as opposed to the local public university 
which has real estate assets dispersed throughout 
the City. 
Key advice to science parks that are now being 
planned or initiated is to focus on the needs of local 
industry. The more focused the programming and 
offerings are to the local needs of industry, the greater 
the likelihood of success.
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5.4 Case study: Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park, Be’er-Sheva, Israel
Based on an interview with Mr. Uzy Zwebner, co-founder and partner of Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies 
Park and president of Innovation Basecamp
Fast Facts: Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park 
Country Israel 
City Be’er Sheva
City population 220,000
Year of creation
City: 1906
Park: 2012 (operations commenced) 
Partnership: see explanation in text
Area/ Built area 117.5 dunams
Main technology sectors Cyber security, AI, IT, IOT, Big data and  Health R&D
Number of companies 72 (12 MNC’s)
Number of employees 2500
Website www.gavyam-negev.co.il
Figure 13. Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park
© Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park
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5.4.1 Institutional set up and Partnership 
The Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park 
(www.gavyam-negev.co.il) is a park located in the 
Negev region, the southern area of Israel at the city 
of Be’er-Sheva, and next to Ben-Gurion University. 
The park initially was developed as a triple helix 
PPP initiative, between Ben Gurion University 
of the Negev, Be’er-Sheva Municipality, and a 
leading technology infrastructures developer, KUD 
International. Later on, Gav Yam, one of the largest 
real estate companies in Israel, joined into the 
partnership. The Park became one of Israel’s leading 
Innovation and R&D Centres with world level appeal.
The initial discussions about the development of 
the Park started almost 15 years ago, between the 
University of Ben- Gurion and the city of Be’er-Sheva, 
while the establishment of PPP partnership with KUD, 
took place 10 years ago, and the commencement of 
operation of the Park in 2012. The location, for which 
the initial concepts were developed, was rather a desert 
area, while today the park is at the heart of a vibrant 
new urban conglomeration, with focus on Technology 
and Innovation, having contributed significantly to the 
development of the greater Negev area.
The rationale of the PPP partnership was quite clear: 
the University contributing the technology leadership, 
the Municipality representing the public interests 
(while the land was given to the park by the state) 
and the private partner brought in finance and 
management / development knowhow.
KUD is a subsidiary of the Japanese Kajima 
Corporation, which among others, specializes in the 
development of technology and R&D infrastructures. 
At a later stage, Gav Yam, a local company of the IDB 
group, well known for development of high tech and 
office buildings, joined the partnership and became 
the main managing partner. 
The initial JV was formed with a direct competitive 
dialogue.
Following several shareholders equity participation, 
capital increases and name changes, currently the 
Park is managed by the Gav-Yam Negev JV of the 
PPP partners.
5.4.2 Contribution of each PPP partner
As mentioned above, it is a conventional PPP partnership, 
where the land is provided by the state and the financing 
was secured by the private investor.
The shareholders structure has evolved significantly with 
time. During the early development period, the state had 
a higher stake due to land and grant contribution. Today, 
the private sector shareholders own the majority of the 
shares, after several capital increases, including the IPO 
(Initial Public Offering) organised by the Gav Yam, as well 
as, by transformation of initial loans to equity (the private 
partners paid the initial phase loans and got equity in Gav 
Yam Negev, with a process of loan to equity swap).
 The state is still supporting the project, strategically, 
by providing incentives for attraction of companies. 
Nevertheless, the responsibility to break even of the 
venture lies with Gav-Yam Negev Company, which 
enjoys financial autonomy. 
The project depends on its real estate component to 
thrive and grow, though it’s very selective when it comes 
to tenant’s acceptance. Tenants are accepted only if 
they bring their R&D operations in the Park. Beside the 
R&D-intensive international and local companies, there 
are some services as food, gym, minimarket, energy 
centre and more.
It is worth noting that many prominent tenants of the 
park are part of CyberSpark the Israeli Cyber Innovation 
Arena. This initiative is an integral part of the Gav-Yam 
Negev Advanced Technologies Park. It is a joint venture 
of the Israeli National Cyber Bureau in the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Be’er-Sheva Municipality, Ben Gurion 
University of the Negev and leading companies in the 
cybersecurity industry. The CyberSpark Arena is located 
inside the park.
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5.4.3 Role of PPP partners in the management 
and at operation of the Technology Park 
The policies, strategies and business plan of the 
Gav-Yam Negev, are formed by the BoD of the JV, 
where all PPP partners participate, i.e. the President 
of the University, the Mayor of Be’er-Sheva, while 
a CEO together with the senior management of the 
Joint Venture is appointed by the private partners. 
The Master Plan and specialisations/directions of 
the Park are jointly developed and decided by the 
three triple helix partners, while the Government is 
also informally involved and consulted, and even 
contributing, for example by encouraging National 
Initiatives, like the National Cyber Securities Research 
Center to be housed within the Park. The University 
plays a critical role in determining the desired 
technology specialisations of future tenants to be 
accepted and making sure new graduates for the 
relevant R&D areas will be available each year. All 
partners are adamant about restricting tenancy to 
R&D activities of companies only.
The surplus of the JV, coming from its operation, is 
invested in further expansion of the infrastructure. 
Currently the infrastructure has reached 60,000 m2. 
of specialised premises, while at the final stage it’s 
expected to reach 200,000 m2. The annual economic 
value of the park to the city and the region is 
estimated today by USD 150 million and will go up to 
USD 1 billion a year, once the park is completed.
Private incubators are also housed within the 
Park, having their own business and operation 
management, in compliance with the overall strategy 
and Master Plan of the Park. The government 
supports these incubators.
5.4.4 Ex-Post view of the PPP venture 
There are 3 types of KPIs for success and impact, 
evaluation, followed by the management of 
Gav–Yam Negev:
a. Creation of jobs for University graduates as a 
national mission; today out of 2,500 engineers 
and scientists employed at the Companies and 
Research Institutions within the Park, 80% are 
coming from Ben Gurion University, Be’er-Sheva 
city and the surroundings. The final target is 
employment of 10,000 high tech experts, once the 
infrastructure reaches 200,000 m2 built floor space.
b. The completion of the stages of development of 
the park in time. Now it’s within its target with 
60,000 m2. built premises. 
c. The connection of Business tenants with 
Academia and R&D. There are 70 companies, 
out of which 30 start-ups, many of them linked 
in a way with the University and R&D Institutes. 
The success of the Park is based on its foundation 
model and initial Master Plan, which envisages 
offering of added value, through the combination of 
tangibles (infrastructure of international standards) 
and intangibles (services) to the tenants. The park is 
much more than just a real estate project, but mainly an 
advanced technology eco-system. Main areas developed 
at the eco system are Cyber, IT, AI, IoT, big data and more.
It is evident, that maturity and success of the first 
of stages, establish a solid basis and make it easier 
for the JV to attract finance for the subsequent 
development stages, as has already been proven, by 
the recent IPO for the last (4) buildings. In addition, 
success is proven by the international attendance, 
that the park receives on a daily basis for exporting 
know how. In this regards it is worth making a 
reference to Innovation Basecamp (www.baseca.mp) 
- a privately owned business platform, a business 
development and investment vehicle aimed for global 
economic development by innovation. It is based on 
a partnership between private and academic entities 
and government involvement, having the mission to 
help high potential research projects become leading 
breakthrough technology start-ups.
Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks JRC
Case study: Gav-Yam Negev Advanced Technologies Park, Be’er-Sheva, Israel | 53
If the management had a chance to look retrospectively 
at the master plan and stages of development, it would 
have insisted on a more thorough elaboration of land 
lease models applied, which were a bit short term 
(<20 years, less than usual long term leases for similar 
projects), a fact that created frequent renegotiation of 
the land lease agreements. 
Currently, the park management is looking at additional 
tools and support packages for international companies 
by promoting the special incentives, talent advantages 
and spirit to the tenants that will take positions in the 
coming years. As to start-up tenants, the park intends 
to achieve a twofold target: attracting prospective 
tenants and creating additional income lines through 
the creation of an own seed capital investment fund.
In conclusion, Gav-Yam Negev is a successful PPP STP 
with satisfied triple helix partners and a showcase for 
other PPP STP developers.
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5.5 Case study: Technology Park Brno, Czech Republic
Based on an interview with Roderick Barker, General Manager
Fast Facts: Technology Park Brno
Based on the case study and website
Country Czech Republic 
City Brno
City population City: approx. 400,000 
Metropolitan area: 1.2 million 
Year of creation 1993
Area / Built area 
Phase 1: 56,000 m2 of office space.
Phase 2 11,000 m2 with 3 new buildings.
Masterplan allows for 190,000 m2 of built-up area in phases 3 and 4.
Main sectors No specific industry or research focus
Number of companies More than 20 companies 
Number of employees More than 5000 employees 
Website http://technologypark.cz/en/
Figure 14. Technology Park Brno
© Technology Park Brno
Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks JRC
Case study: Technology Park Brno, Czech Republic | 55
5.5.1 The institutional set-up and partnership
The impressive development was officially launched 
in 1993. The first ideas developed around 1990/1 
just after the collapse of the communist government 
in Czechoslovakia. The initial idea was to provide for 
expansion space for newly created companies around 
the renowned Brno University of Technology (BUT). 
The development site was ideally located: directly 
adjacent to the large properties of BUT, part of the 
inner city of Brno in a green suburban environment.
The main motive was the apparent need of additional 
capital, world-class administrative efficiency and 
the need to gain the experience of a seasoned 
commercial partner.
A famous alumnus of the BUT, Sir Frank Lampl, 
inspired and sped up the planning and starting process 
of the new company. As a successful international 
businessman, he had developed contacts to the city 
government and BUT and developed as the person 
of trust. He was able to convince the shareholder of 
BOVIS (the large UK construction group of which he 
was part of the international management team) to 
expand their activities to the East. There was no formal 
tendering process. The joint venture contract was, as 
the current General Manager calls it: “a straightforward 
PLC company joint venture contract as they are 
standard in the real estate development business”.
The development success is impressive: To date, 
Phase 1 has been completed with 56,000 m2 of office 
space. Phase 2 has reached 11,000 m2 with 3 new 
buildings. The masterplan allows for 190,000 m2 of 
built-up area in phases 3 and 4.68
5.5.2 Contributions of each partner
The initial plan was to create a joint venture of 
200 hectares, but due to restitution problems the 
initial project phase started with a 50%50% joint 
venture Technologicky Park Brno (TPB, also called 
Czech Technology Park, http://technologypark.cz/en/) 
and covered 9 hectares (as a long lease to the 
company) and a matching CZK 80 million by BOVIS. 
The 50% share of BRNO was equally split by the 
city government of BRNO and the BTU. The BOVIS 
50% share did not change, however, BOVIS itself 
were a subsidiary of P&O, a large conglomerate 
(main business in ports and ferries). Later on, P&O 
restructured and sold a lot of their real estate 
to invest into their cruise ship business and port 
operations. In the years prior to 2000 TPB carried 
a lot of losses. They kept these losses in the books 
to avoid write-downs. Even though the general 
performance of the development was highly 
satisfactory, this very debt-driven financial structure 
was not compatible with the strategy of the holding 
company. Subsequently P&O was purchased wholly 
by Port of Dubai Holding company, now the holding 
company of the former Bovis/P&O’s 50%. As of 2019 
it was planned that the City of Brno takes over the 
share from Dubai.
The nominal equity of the company has remained the 
same. Though, all projects were financed via debt. 
This was possible as basically all buildings were built 
as pre-let buildings to large international companies 
with prime tenant valuations. Only from 2002 
cash-flow was positive and money was re-invested 
and debt re-payed. Dividends were only payed 
once – in 2004. On the other hand, these financing 
structures meant that the tenant focus was tuned to 
large inward investment projects of renowned and 
stable multinational companies.
In the early 1990s, many international companies 
were looking for sites to open locations in 
Czechoslovakia. A lot of substantial government 
incentives were put in place to gain inward 
investments. Initially incentives were targeted 
towards production related industries, later in 
the 1990s service industries were included. The 
area managed to become the prime site for the 
new locations of IBM, Red Hat, Hewlett Packard, 
VELUX, MANN+HUMMEL, Emerson and the like. The 
organization boasts to actually having gained the 
dominant share of foreign investments of the whole 
country (“we lost only one of the major deals”).
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5.5.3 The Role of the PPP partners in 
management and operations
From the start of the project the current manager 
of the park has been in responsibility as General 
Manager as a permanently seconded specialist to the 
joint venture by BOVIS. The team totals four people: 
Facility Management, Marketing, Administration, and 
Real Estate Development (the manager).
All innovation related support elements of start-up 
support, incubation centres, accelerators, know-how 
transfer are performed exclusively by BUT, which is, 
as previously mentioned, one of the shareholders in 
the Joint Venture company. The strategy of the TPB 
is therefore the strategy of a classical real estate 
company. The Board consists of the responsible 
General Manager of P&O, the Port of Dubai 
Representatives (2) and the city representatives (2), 
who are two senior politicians. Shareholder meetings 
are just once a year.
The most important recent change is the systematic 
opening towards regional SME: some of the leases of 
large international conglomerates were discontinued. 
Subsequently these buildings were let to profitable 
strong SMEs at good rates compatible with the 
financing strategy of the real estate company. The 
selection criteria are: 
1. Older than three-years-old 
2. Stable and sizeable number of employees
3. Good business perspective 
Profitability (EBITDA or earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortisation) is the main 
performance indicator of TPB. The surplus income 
is used to reinvest and pay back loans. Profit and 
loss are shared by the JV partners according to their 
shares. The tenant structure is critical to a real estate 
company which is highly leveraged. Any major shift 
towards smaller less well rated companies would 
have influence on the ability to refinance.
Due to the high share of private ownership and 
being a strictly profit oriented organisation it could 
not apply for any regional development funds from 
the EU. There is no specific industry or research 
focus. However, as the City of Brno intends to buy the 
shares from the Port of Dubai, an alignment of the 
strategy towards the development strategies of the 
regions can be expected.69
The ecosystem development is mainly in the hands of 
the university. However, it is closely monitored strategy 
of TPB to attract international tech companies only. 
This profile is a topic in the Board Meeting.
5.5.4 Ex-post view of the PPP-Management 
Private owners have inflated profit expectations, thus 
slowing down growth. With more equity and more 
land supply the park could have grown faster. The 
location was formidable since its inception and still 
is. The management feels that the term “technology 
park” is overrating their profile. He’d rather call it a 
business park focused on technology companies.
The advice for future technology park developments: 
Have strong committed private shareholders, manage 
their expectations well. Think long term. PPP only 
work in hot growth areas with sound real estate 
fundamentals.
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5.6 Case study: Technology Park Ljubljana, Slovenia
Based on an interview with Matej Cerar, CEO (2019) and Simona Vernon, Entrepreneurship Director
Fast Facts: Technology Park Ljubljana
Country Slovenia
City Ljubljana
City population 300,000
Year of creation 1995
Area / Built area 75,000 m2
Main technology sectors ICT, Electromechanics, lasers, medical, biotech
Number of companies 300
Website https://www.tp-lj.si/en
Figure 15. Technology Park Ljubljana 
© Technology Park Ljubljana
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5.6.1 Institutional Set Up and Partnership
The Technology Park Ljubljana (TPL www.tp-lj.si), is 
quite an early triple helix initiative. The Company 
for development of the Park was established in 
1995 as an initiative of the largest R&D Institute 
of Slovenia Jozef Stefan (www.ijs.si). Later in 2001 
the Municipality of Ljubljana entered the ownership 
structure, provided the land and after completion 
of phase one of four buildings (out of seven) the 
Park commercially opened in 2007. The rest of 
the partners are the National Institute of Biology, 
National Institute of Chemistry, the City of Ljubljana 
and the private companies LEK pharma (now part of 
Sandoz), ISKRA ICT complex, and ISKRATEL.
The partnership for TPL development was formed 
through public consultation. Apart from the 
conceptual need to have the triple helix on board the 
project, the contribution of: 
• land by the municipality and attraction of
EU grant,
• the private partners offer of the majority
of funding in form of equity and commercial
credits; and
• the Institutes offer of technology leadership,
led to a practical PPP partnership. All parties 
participated from the conception of the final 
Infrastructure project (2003-2005) till the 
commencement of the operation of TPL by forming a 
not–for–profit–foundation.
Phase one with four buildings had a cost of about 
EUR 48 million while the second Phase with 
three more buildings had a cost of additional 
EUR 15 million.
The financial structure of the partnership underwent 
various changes with time, mainly due to hard efforts 
for loan repayment during the early operation period. 
Commercial commencement coincided with the years 
of the crisis (around 2007). Several of the SME tenants 
undertook repayments of the loan (in a form of debt 
for equity) and then became owners of the premises 
they occupy. Thus, today out of 75,000 m2. of TPL, the 
Management Company (foundation) of TPL owns only 
5,000 m2., while the rest are owned by the SME tenants.
The current Management Company shares 
distribution is: City of Ljubljana (City of Ljubljana 
Holding Co) with 85.7% of shares, the R&D Institutes 
own 9.6% of shares and the rest is owned by the 
initial founding companies. 
The Board of Directors (BoD) has a composition which 
reflects the triple helix partnership.
5.6.2 Contribution of each Partner
As referred above, the municipality provided the land 
as well arranged for the attraction of an EU grant by 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
Institutes and especially the Josef Stefan coordinated 
stakeholders’ alignment throughout phases, as well 
as the technical maturing documentation preparation. 
The private partners contributed EUR 4 million in 
equity and guaranteed EUR 24 million of loans. As 
also mentioned above, loans were finally paid by 
tenant companies in a form of debt to equity and 
property swap, so today 100 SMEs own 70,000 m2 of 
the 75,000 m2 of TPL, however these SMEs have no 
shares in the management company of the Park. 
Today the Management Company is sustainable and 
is earning its income by a model 40/40/20, i.e. 40% 
proceeds coming from the rents of 5,000 m2, 40% by 
performing innovation/technology related projects for 
the greater region and 20% by offering technology 
related services to tenants.
The 40% income from public sources for special 
programs is gained from EU or national sources 
through competitive procedures and not direct funding.
The Management Company is staffed with 18 
experienced experts, so it’s one of the rather 
sizeable STP management companies, among IASP 
peers. The success in attracting funds for special 
programs (start-up support, international cooperation, 
tech-transfer, IPR, training, etc.) and the added value 
of services offered, make it economically viable with 
such an extensive staffing. It could be viable with 
fewer activities and less income, too.
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5.6.3 Role of PPP Partners in the Management 
and Operation of the Park
The decisions on the policies and strategies need to 
be taken unanimously by the board. Due to the fact, 
that SME owners of premises located in the park are 
not represented in the Board of Directors, there is an 
ongoing initiative for creation of an Advisory Board 
of owners/tenants for consultation and coordination 
with the TPL Managing Board.
The Strategy of the Park goes through 3 major steps:
• Step 1: the creation of tangible and intangible
infrastructure development, buildings, services
programs (accomplished)
• Step 2: Internationalisation step (on going)
• Step 3: Strengthening the R&D within the Park
(immediate future target)
The strategy is aligned to national and local 
innovation and smart specialisation strategies.
The income of the Management Company is 
sufficient for break-even of its activity costs, but for 
a further expansion of the Park’s infrastructure, new 
PPP schemes will be needed.
In any case, even in the event of a deficit, the public 
sector has no responsibility to cover the debt, thus 
the Management company should continuously put 
an effort aiming towards a break-even activity.
For the selection and admission of tenants, TPL 
convenes special purpose committees applying 
the selection criteria (innovation and strong 
internationalisation focus of candidate tenants). 
5.6.4 Ex Post view of the PPP venture
TPL is a successful STP, acknowledged by local and 
international stakeholders and peers, especially for 
its services to start up and innovation community 
even outside of Ljubljana city. Hosting or supporting 
more than 300 SME and start-up companies with 
1,500 highly qualified employees, yielding over 
EUR 0.5 billion turnover, running eight national and 
regional start-up programs, supporting over 60 
start-ups with EUR 3.5 million investments annually, 
and coming out as a winner of many international 
best practices awards, are just a few factors of the 
evaluation metrics.
Today the Park Management team places more 
emphasis on the qualitative criteria such as how 
many people from all over the country are attracted 
to the Park events, how many tenants are happy 
with the services of the Management Company, 
the number of international cooperation projects 
they carry out (today the value of the international 
and Horizon partnership programs under execution 
amounts to about EUR 4 million).
The combination of high-level infrastructure with 
high quality services and the continuously and 
internationally expanding footprint of TPL, not 
only make the Park very attractive for innovative 
companies, but also lays a solid basis for a further 
expansion of the infrastructure and attraction of 
investors based on PPP. This has become now easier 
compared to the period when the project commenced.
Despite some difficulties experienced at the initial 
conception phase, the Park has proven its capabilities 
and success.
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The current management, evaluating the history of 
the Park and having the chance to reflect on negative 
and positive lessons learned, states that:
• Not enough thought and strategic approach
has been given in the initial planning
for linking expectations and content
(tenants / innovation / sectors) with the rather 
large in size planned infrastructure. For the
planning of a next phase, the strategy and
business plan should determine the expansion
around the content/type and quality of tenants,
so buildings will serve specific purposes, rather
than being built and then to have to deal with
occupancy/viability pressure.
• Although it was not the intention of the park
management (taking a content strategic
approach, instead of infrastructure development
driven project) during the enthusiastic
— but also influenced by the world recession —
inception period of the STP, certain premises
were given to banks, consultants, lawyers and
other non-tech companies aiming to achieve
quickly a viable financial structure. Nevertheless,
at the end the TPL did work and it served the
initial triple helix model. The project has a
significant country level impact, while it could
have been in an even better position with a
more careful strategic planning.
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5.7 Case study: Ann Arbor SPARK, Michigan, USA
Based on an interview with Paul Krutko, President and CEO
Fast Facts: Area of Innovation Ann Arbor SPARK 
Country United States of America
City Ann Arbor
State: Michigan (population 9,995,915)
City population 121,885
Year of creation 
of Ann Arbor SPARK 2006
Area / Built area City has an area of 28.70 square miles (74.33 square kilometres);
Rented/dedicated building: 18,000 square ft.
Main technology sectors 
Automotive & mobility technology, biotechnology, digital health/ med devices, artificial 
intelligence, e-commerce (consumer products and services), cyber security, augmented and 
virtual reality, financial technology, internet of things/big data
Number of companies Washtenaw County (Ann Arbor MSA): 8,212 establishments;
Downtown district: approx. 180 companies 
Number of employees
• About 61,000 in the city of Ann Arbor;
• About 152,000 for county (Ann Arbor MSA);
• Approx. 3000 in the downtown district
Website https://annarborusa.org/ (Ann Arbor SPARK website)
https://www.a2gov.org/ (city government)
© Oxford Companies
Figure 16. Area of Innovation Ann Arbor SPARK
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5.7.1 Questions regarding the institutional 
set up of the partnership
In 2005, the new President of the University of 
Michigan (UofM), Mary Sue Coleman was concerned 
about how effective the University was in impacting 
the regional economy through the commercialisation 
of its research. This was an important concern 
because the University of Michigan is one of the 
largest research universities in the United States, 
with a current budget of USD 1.5 billion annually. 
The President’s question centred around why 
University of Michigan was not generating the start-
ups 
and spinouts like MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) and Stanford given that the University 
of Michigan’s research budget was larger than both 
and why there was not significant technology 
company growth through investment and job 
creation in the Ann Arbor region.
The President convened a national advisory panel of 
alumni which included Rick Snyder, who later became 
the Governor of Michigan (serving between 2011 and 
2019) and who had recently left his position as the 
CEO of Gateway (a major American computer 
hardware company acquired by Taiwanese 
corporation Acer in 2007). Snyder was leading a 
venture capital firm in Ann Arbor at that time. The 
advisory panel developed a triple helix organization 
called Ann Arbor SPARK which was an initiative which 
assembled private sector, academia - the University 
of Michigan, Eastern Michigan University, and 
Washtenaw Community College as well as local 
government. Snyder was named the first chairperson 
of the SPARK board of directors.
The initiative had three initial objectives for UofM: 
• Help start-ups grow out of the University 
Michigan. 
• Improve the capabilities of The University of 
Michigan’s Technology Transfer Office.
• Direct some of the school’s fundraising 
proceeds 
(target 10%) into early stage companies 
without any geographic restriction. 
Overall, SPARK’s primary mission was and is to 
bring together private and public partners, like 
the Michigan Economic Development Corporation70 
(MEDC), Michigan Works! Association71, city and 
municipal partners, University of Michigan, and by 
2019 eighty private sector companies to support the 
growth of existing companies and the creation of new 
technology-based companies and jobs in the counties 
surrounding Ann Arbor.
One mandate was to tie into the University’s alumni 
network and talent pool to help market Ann Arbor as 
an attractive place to start a company or relocate an 
existing one. The University of Michigan’s 500,000 
living alumni community is one of the largest in the 
country. Its graduates include such Silicon Valley 
luminaries such as Larry Page, a co-founder of Google. 
At present Ann Arbor SPARK (www.annarborusa.
org) has evolved into an area of innovation serving 
companies scattered throughout the downtown 
innovation district and the surrounding region. In the 
downtown district alone, there are approximately 
180 companies with over 3000 employees in existing 
private real estate. SPARK provides services and 
support where they are domiciled and also rents 
an 18,000 square foot building that houses offices, 
events space, start-up tenants, etc.
5.7.2 Questions regarding the contribution 
of each PPP partner
The operating company was structured as a non-profit. 
In order to cover the non-profit’s operating expenses, 
the University of Michigan committed USD 300, 00072 
annually to the operating budget with the private 
sector and local government expected to match. 
Within the first 12 months of SPARKS’ launch, Pfizer 
left the City of Ann Arbor as a result of the next 
generation of Lipitor failing its clinical trials. Hundreds 
of jobs in the community were lost. Pfizer also 
provided an anchor for corporate social responsibility 
in the region. Another cathartic event included the 
financial distress of Borders Books, a local bookstore 
that had become a global chain. Borders closed its 
doors, creating significant vacancy in the downtown 
and a resulting loss in customers for restaurants and 
shops nearby creating additional vacancy.
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The nascent Ann Arbor SPARK partnership capitalised 
on its triple helix structure as a result of Pfizer’s 
withdrawal creating lemonade out lemons. The 
University acquired Pfizer assets at a significant 
discount which it then incorporated into as a research 
and development asset of the University. The SPARK 
program with its primary focus on the technology 
company growth and on traditional economic 
development activities was well positioned to 
dramatically impact the growth of the region’s GDP.
Contemporaneously, Larry Page, a University of 
Michigan alumnus decided to place the Google’s 
United States AdWords operation inside the SPARK 
Innovation District. The Google operations initially 
were located in the downtown core area of the city 
abutting the University.
The State of Michigan was also seeking to improve its 
overall economic development posture and identified 
the Ann Arbor Innovation District as a geography 
to support through its SMARTZone program. The 
State allocated a portion of the revenues generated 
from taxing real estate value growth as a result of 
business activity in the district to support the growth 
and acceleration of technology start-ups. The initial 
funding raised through this scheme in 2002 was 
$60k. Over the ensuing 15 years, this allocation 
has risen to USD 3.5 million per annum supporting 
technology companies. The State of Michigan recently 
passed legislation to reauthorize this program in Ann 
Arbor for an additional 15 years.
A virtuous cycle was created: as growing tech 
companies filled up vacant space, market rates for 
the space increased thereby further increasing the 
tax base. For example, Google occupied a multi-story 
building that had been previously a bank headquarters. 
Even though it did not fully occupy the building, their 
presence attracted other tenants. In 2005, the vacancy 
rates in the Innovation District were greater than 
20%. Vacancy rates are now running at less than 2%. 
Capital costs73 are usually borne by the companies 
themselves in negotiation with landlords or developers. 
In the Google example, the company was responsible 
for their own capital costs.
5.7.3 Questions regarding the role of the 
PPP partners in the management 
and operation of the STP
The ownership of Ann Arbor SPARK evolved over 15 
years. Originally, the structure was a tacit partnership 
between local government and the University of 
Michigan. A non-profit entity was formed under 
Federal and State laws in which the Board consisted of 
private sector representatives, the local municipality, 
and academia. Every year the budget of SPARK is 
determined by a board consisting of members from 
local government, academia and private sector who 
devise a program of activities based on funding 
contributions from each of those sectors.
Presently there are 80 private companies who annually 
fund SPARK, including large corporations such as 
Google and Toyota and smaller local firms. These 
private companies have a mix of motivations ranging 
from being good corporate citizens as well as seeking 
to benefit from the showcase of technology that is 
presented. Some of the private sector funders use 
money from their own foundations to support SPARK, 
not money from their operations. In the report for 
2018 which is publicly available on the organisation’s 
website74 the total budget is USD 6.47 million, 
the major part of which dedicated to acceleration, 
incubation and grants to early stage companies 
while the operating budget was USD 1.875 million. 
The funding sources for this operating part were 
roughly split into 1:1:3 respectively for public (which 
includes government & municipal funding), academia 
(university) and private contributions and sponsorships.75 
Some companies provide non-budgetary contributions, 
an example of which are credits given to SPARK by 
Google for social media marketing. 
The City of Ann Arbor’s motivation is that SPARK has 
enabled a professional staff that it otherwise would 
not have been able to afford without the benefit of 
additional resources from the private and academic 
sectors. City of Ann Arbor contributes USD 75,000 to 
the yearly USD 7.0 million effort (rounded total budget). 
During the 2008 – 2012 timeframe, Michigan was 
still viewed as a flyover State for venture capital 
investing. Recognizing Ann Arbor SPARK’s success in 
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nurturing start-ups and accelerating their growth, the 
State of Michigan through the Economic Development 
initiative of the Governor, created a state funded VC 
fund of USD 24 million paid to be housed at SPARK. 
SPARK made pre-seed investments in over 100 
companies across the State of Michigan with half of 
the portfolio being located in the Ann Arbor region as 
a locus of technology start-ups. The State required 
that 50% of the its funding must be matched by 
other sources. To date, USD 560 million of additional 
capital came into the portfolio companies. 70% of the 
companies originally invested in are still in existence.
On the non-start-up side there is a variety of city 
and local government support with the university 
providing approximately 15% of the funding, the 
private sector about 30%, and the remainder coming 
from a variety of city and local government sources76. 
After a national search, the group hired Krutko77 in 
2011, an experienced Silicon Valley economic 
development executive as its second CEO. His 
tenure has been marked by the ability78 to attract 
technology companies from Silicon Valley to locate 
facilities in the Ann Arbor area of innovation.
5.7.4 Structure/Governance
Since 2011, SPARK has attracted approximately USD 
1.5 billion in investment in company investment and 
15k new jobs. In 2018, USD 150 million was the 
investment by the private sector, signalling that the 
private sector role is a mature one. 
It is estimated that 50% of all start-ups in the State 
of Michigan happen in and around the Ann Arbor 
area of innovation. Ann Arbor attracts successful 
entrepreneurs from across the state and the nation.
The local chamber of commerce primarily works 
with the private sector companies serving the local 
market. SPARK’s focus is on companies from the 
start-up phase through mature players like the 
Toyota North America Research Facility that are 
growing the regional GDP by selling goods and 
services outside the region to national and global 
markets and not local ones. 
SPARK CEO sees himself as helping to lead strategic 
projects on behalf of the stakeholder members of 
Ann Arbor’s triple helix by developing the concept, 
bringing new and current players to the table, and 
providing an environment and community to facilitate 
partnerships and investment.
SPARK can be seen as a premier example of an 
emerging Area of Innovation / Innovation District  
model in the US. This model is coming more and 
more to the fore and to some extent replacing 
“science parks” as the leading model.
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5.8 Case study: Milan Innovation District (MIND), Milan, Italy
Based on an interview with Marco Carabelli, Managing Director of Arexpo Spa; Andrea Ruckstuhl, CEO of 
Lendlease Italia; and Francesco Mandruzzato, head of Project Financing Lendlease Italia79
Fast Facts: MIND – Milan Innovation District
Country Italy
City, population Milan, approx. 1.4 million, metropolitan area 4.3 million 
Year of creation Concession contract approved in 2020
Status (Q2 2020) Construction
Area / Built Area 
The entire site land area: 1 million m2.
Gross leasable area for private function: roughly 477,500 m2.
Gross built area for Public anchors: over 300,000 m2.
Main technology sectors Life Sciences, Healthcare, Biotechnologies, Smart City solutions 
Total committed investment by private partner Approx. EUR 2.5 billion over the 99 years period.
Website www.mindmilano.it/en/
Figure 17. Milan Innovation District - MIND (in construction)
© Lendlease, credits CRA
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Milan Innovation District (MIND, www.mindmilano.it/en/) 
is the first Innovation District so defined in Milan, 
a city that already constitutes the economic and 
innovation hub of Italy. Milan hosts the headquarters 
of 3,100 multinational companies and attracts 
almost 50% of all private equity and venture capital 
investments in the country. Milan is the capital of 
Lombardy, a region hosting about 23% of Italian 
start-ups, 28% of national scientific publications 
and 30% of national patents. Its GDP in 2017 was 
around EUR 370 billion, roughly 20% of Italy’s 
GDP and competing with Île-de France, Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg and London. The region hosts 
14 Universities, 4 Art Academies, 12 national 
research centres, and 19 research and treatment 
hospitals, and one of JRC (European Commission) 
main research centres, located in Ispra (Varese).
Despite such an abundance, MIND is unique. It 
has been conceived as a flagship project for the 
nation with the capability to compete on the global 
innovation space. This is due to both defining features 
of the project and contextual factors. First of all, MIND 
is the legacy project of EXPO, the Universal Exhibition 
hosted in the city in 2015. The international event 
embodied Italy at its best, something which became 
evident both in the national perception and for the 
international audience. Public institutions invested 
EUR 1.6 billion to realise EXPO and 21 million people 
visited from all over the world, thus becoming a 
matter of national pride. To crown such a success the 
Italian government championed the establishment of 
a new research centre on the future of health – the 
Human Technopole – for which it committed to fund 
EUR 1.5 billion in 10 years. The research centre was 
conceived as the legacy project of EXPO 2015, which 
was dedicated to nutrition and human wellbeing. 
At the same time its purpose was to support the 
growth of Italian industry and promote national 
lifestyle associated to health and quality of life. 
The focus on economic and social impact was not 
secondary either at the time, given the difficulties 
Italy had been going through since 2012, following 
the global financial crisis. In those years Italy 
lost 1.1-1.2 million jobs and was on the verge of 
defaulting on its sovereign debt. 
The Human Technopole, and later on MIND, came to 
be designed around the idea of fostering economic 
growth and social progress building on the industrial 
strengths of Milan and broader Lombardy region, 
and realigning the country to global technological 
and innovation trends. At the time of MIND’s 
establishment, the national economy was in times 
of sluggish recovery from the recent crisis, while 
the regional economy was growing at a moderate 
pace (+1.5-2.5%) and the regional Life Science 
production was booming (+13.7% with respect 
to 2017). Just recently the city of Milan has also 
started to experience a quick expansion of real 
estate developments, with commitments of roughly 
EUR 10 billion from multiple developers for the period 
2019-2029.
Having been conceived at times of economic crisis, 
the key motive for the set-up of MIND was to 
capitalise on the positive experience of Milan 2015 
Expo, which helped to put the city on the map as 
one of the world’s innovation hubs, and to create a 
gateway for the regional and national excellences in 
terms of scientific research and industrial production 
in the life sciences. A further purpose emerged 
over time: a city-scale lab to experiment with the 
new solutions for urban living such as driverless 
public transport with no private cars allowed inside 
the site, zero CO2 emissions, and local energy 
production. According to a preliminary study that was 
commissioned to The European House Ambrosetti 
in 2017. According to the study, the foreseeable 
socio-economic impact of a STP/Innovation District 
in the area is substantial, with an aggregate 
multiplier of R&D activities of 2.84 (meaning that 
for every EUR 100 invested EUR 284 of expenditure 
are generated, 25% of which coming from the 
manufacturing sector). The same multiplier is 
estimated to amount to 2.23 for investments in the 
healthcare sector, and 1.44 in university education, 
with an overall economic impact (direct, indirect and 
induced impacts on the expenditure linked to the 
activities of MIND) of EUR 6.9 billion during the first 
10 years of operation80. The study also estimates 
the generation of additional EUR 3 billion in terms 
of added value and EUR 1.3 billion of additional tax 
revenues in the same period. 
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5.8.1 Institutional Set Up and Partnership
The rationale behind the PPP, which was formed 
through traditional tender under public procurement 
law, was a combination of reasons, including the 
need to tap into private capitals to boost the effects 
of the public investments (both in terms of land 
acquisition and the budget of the newly founded 
Human Technopole) and the need to share the risk 
burden for the regeneration project. Moreover, since 
the beginning the public counterpart pushed for 
the realisation of the project in accordance with a 
tight timeline, avoiding delays and postponements, 
meaning that the involvement of a private partner 
was considered also as a means to increase 
administrative efficiency. 
The two main partners involved in the PPP are, for 
the public sector, Arexpo – publicly owned company 
whose shareholders are the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (39.28%), Lombardy Region (21.05%), 
Municipality of Milan (21.05%), Milan Fair Foundation 
(16.80%), Città Metropolitana of Milan (1.21) and 
the Municipality of Rho (0.61%) – and, for the private 
sector, Lendlease – Australian developer specialised 
in urban regeneration and infrastructure projects 
operating in North America, Europe, South East 
Asia and Australia, with total value of regeneration 
projects worldwide about AUD 76 billion81. Other 
stakeholders play a key role in the development of 
the area, including the three public “anchors”: the 
University of Milan, the Human Technopole and the 
Galeazzi Hospital, which will provide a solid base for 
the creation of the innovation ecosystem. The PPP on 
which MIND is based involves Arexpo and Lendlease. 
Both partners were involved in the planning and will 
be involved in the construction and operation phases 
(although with different roles, as explained in detail 
below), and the legal form of the partnership is a 
concession contract.
The key steps in the set-up of MIND were the signing 
of the agreement for the development of the area at 
the end of the tendering procedure in March 2018, 
and the signing of the concession of the area from 
Arexpo to Lendlease, which occurred in April 2019. 
At that point both the City Councils of Milan and Rho 
have to finalize the approval process for the Urban 
planning for the concession contract to design, build, 
finance and operate (in PPP jargon called DBFO) 
starts - due by mid 2020. This is the pivotal moment 
when Arexpo hands over the control of the MIND 
project to Lendlease (more precisely a half of the 
area, as explained below). The contract will last for 
99 years, quite a remarkable lapse of time which is 
equivalent to three cycles in real estate projects. Such 
a timeframe forces the private developer to take a 
long-term view on value creation by design, aligning 
its interests with public value creation. This is the 
achievement of a long journey started with a failure, 
which in hindsight was responsible for triggering the 
innovation process. 
In 2014, the public auction to purchase the land of the 
EXPO at the end of the event went void. The opening 
bid was EUR 315 million for roughly 1 million square 
metres located in the periphery of Milan. The area has 
an important development potential due to its strategic 
location (close to Milan city centre and communication 
hub for the rest of the region) and was equipped with 
all the necessary infrastructures in preparation for the 
2015 EXPO. But the constraints on development – less 
than half of the site could be developed anew – and 
the loss of land value caused by the economic crisis, 
made the proposition unconvincing. 
This was a serious risk for the success of the EXPO 
itself, since Milan had been selected thanks to 
the regeneration plan of the area. Arexpo, which 
had the mandate to acquire the land (for about 
EUR 180 million), manage all the infrastructure 
operations in preparation of the event, and had to step 
in and change the plan for the hand over to the private 
sector after the event. In 2016, Arexpo launched the 
Strategic Plan for the development and improvement 
of the area as a new Science and Technology Park 
(STP) dedicated to Life Sciences, Healthcare, Biotech, 
Pharma, Agri-food, Nutrition and Data Science. The 
plan was backed by government with the creation of 
the Human Technopole and a new scientific campus 
of the University of Milan, two public anchors that 
once operational are to bring a critical mass of users: 
Human Technopole 1,500 scientists and University 
of Milan 18,000 students and 4,000 staff. The plan 
attracted the interest in partnering of several public 
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organisations and private companies. In 2017 Galeazzi 
Hospital finalised its plan to relocate in MIND joining 
as third public anchor attracting further 8,000 people 
every day, including 500 researchers, 700 doctors, 
and 1,100 nurses and caregivers. Such a new setting 
finally made the offer appealing to market operators. 
At the time of writing the Human Technopole, the 
University of Milan and the Galeazzi Hospital are the 
three major confirmed public anchors.82
In 2017, an invitation to tender was launched and 
the response of the market was positive, reaching 
beyond national borders. In the tender’s provisions 
the private sector was called to partner in the 
regeneration and development of the area starting 
with the design of the masterplan, business plan and 
innovation strategy, and then in the development and 
management of the site for 99 years. More precisely, 
the contract was divided into two phases: i) an 
advisory service phase to assist Arexpo on technical, 
economic and financial aspects of the masterplan 
and business plan for the entire site (1 million square 
metres) in 2018-2019, up to the approval of the 
Urban planning by the local municipalities; and ii) 
a development phase, based on a concession of 
development rights amounting up to 477,500 m2 
for a 99 years leasehold period, in exchange for the 
payment of a yearly rent fee to Arexpo.83 As outcome 
of the tender procedure, the Net Present Value of 
the yearly rent fee for the surface right is equal to 
ca. EUR 250 million for the 99 years. In addition, 
the concessionaire will contribute to urbanization 
infrastructure costs for a EUR 135 million value.
In December 2017 Lendlease was selected as 
preferred bidder and awarded the contract, making 
MIND the first project for an Innovation District the 
company has embarked on. This to stress the role 
that the innovation strategy, discussed in greater 
detail below, has taken over the other components 
of the development project. In 2018, when phase 1 
started, it had not yet become evident to Lendlease 
and Arexpo the pivotal role that the potential of 
research & innovation and the involvement of the 
public anchors – excellence in the field in their own 
capacity – would take for the success of the project. 
In April 2019 Arexpo signed the concession contract 
with Lendlease. as soon as both the City Councils 
of Milan and Rho approve Urban Planning and the 
related Planning agreement, the 99 years concession 
comes into force and Lendlease formally starts 
operating as developer of MIND for the following 99 
years (phase 2).84
5.8.2 Contribution and role of PPP Partners
In terms of mutual contribution to the project, 
Arexpo is the owner of the land, part of which is 
provided in exchange of a periodic rent to the private 
partner. The gross leasable area measures roughly 
477,500 m2and will be conceded for 99 years. 
Beside the area subject to private development, 
the areas to be occupied by the public anchors 
measure over 300,000 m2. The overall value of public 
investments in the area, including the market value 
of all constructions and infrastructures built for the 
universal exposition, is about EUR 2 billion. Together 
with such investments, Arexpo was also responsible 
for the project conception, in particular through the 
Strategic Plan for the development and improvement 
of the area as a new Innovation District dedicated 
to the Life Sciences, Healthcare, Biotech, Pharma, 
Agri-food, Nutrition, Data Science and the city of the 
future. Crucially, Arexpo provided a privileged channel 
of interaction with public authorities, favouring an 
efficient compliance of administrative procedures and 
constant stakeholder alignment. 
On the other hand, the private counterpart, Lendlease, 
committed to investments for what adds up to a 
total of roughly EUR 2.5 billion over the 99 years 
period. This estimate, which refers to the final value 
of the overall development carried out by Lendlease, 
takes into consideration the EUR 250 million NPV 
for the 477,500 m2surface right and the EUR 135 
million of urbanisation infrastructure costs, plus all 
the costs Lendlease will face for the construction 
of the innovation district itself. The estimate will 
also vary according to the private investments that 
international private operators will make in the area 
thanks to MIND’s attractiveness, even though it is 
difficult to make a proper assessment of the total 
amount at such an early phase. From the point of 
view of the operations Lendlease will be responsible 
for the project construction which is expected to 
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last at least 10 years, and after the construction 
phase for the management of the Innovation District. 
Although the economic sustainability of the project 
would be ensured by real estate dimension alone 
(i.e. renting of spaces and serviced building to 
tenants), the long-term value creation for MIND will 
come from investing on the innovation component. 
In particular, Lendlease aims at putting in place a set 
of new instruments to capture the value generated 
by the innovation dimension of the site - namely the 
innovation ecosystem – generating a value multiplier 
for real estate, business and social domains.85 
This includes the definition of an industrial strategy 
– initially defined ‘MIND Innovation Strategy’ and 
then evolved in the bespoke ‘Federated Innovation’ – 
that takes in consideration and amplifies the human 
capital and infrastructures of MIND’s public anchors 
and the regional strengths in the Life Sciences 
sectors and smart city services. According to the PPP 
agreement, the operational costs of the activities 
carried out within MIND will be covered by Arexpo, 
Lendlease, public and private sector players. Being 
at such an early stage of development, MIND has 
not generated any surplus from its operations, but in 
the future it is imaginable to conceive an ecosystem 
model in which the surplus is partly reinvested in the 
district itself to increase its competitiveness, partly 
employed to fund initiatives at the regional level that 
support the growth of the whole ecosystem which in 
turn will benefit MIND.
Although MIND is still in its inception phase, 
its strategy is being developed through tight 
collaboration and co-creation between Arexpo and 
Lendlease, through the help of a team of national 
and international consultants that include Carlo Ratti 
Associati, PlusValue Advisory, Urban Insight, PWC, and 
Land. CARIPLO Factory (Fondazione CARIPLO) and 
Birds&Birds for the innovation ecosystem component. 
The strategy draws on the research by The Brookings 
Institution, which has defined Innovation Districts 
as “geographic areas where anchor institutions 
and companies cluster and connect with small 
firms, start-ups, and business incubators. Physically 
compact, transit-accessible, and technically wired, 
they offer mixed-use housing, office and retail”86. 
They are an emerging 21st Century model of 
innovation that differs from the isolated, sprawling 
development patterns of science parks and science 
corridors, and aim at generating models whereby 
innovation is more horizontal and open, increasing 
the amount of cross-fertilization across actors and 
sectors. 
While all construction and management decisions 
concerning the area interested by the PPP are and 
will be made by Lendlease, all main stakeholders 
will be involved and consulted on significant matters 
relevant to the management of the Innovation 
District through a strategic committee composed 
by the top management of all anchors and major 
tenants (currently Arexpo, Lendlease, Human 
Technopole, Galeazzi Hospital, the University of Milan, 
and Fondazione Triulza), meeting monthly/bimonthly. 
In order to add strength to MIND’s decision making 
structure, especially from the point of view of its 
innovation roadmap, an international advisory council 
has been set up with the participation of global 
leading figures in the fields of technology, science, 
finance and economics including Physics Nobel 
Laureate Barry Barish, Alexandre de Rothschild, Greg 
Papadopoulos and Laura Tyson, and which others will 
join in the future. The international advisory council 
is chaired by Alberto Sangiovanni Vincentelli, founder 
of two NASDAQ listed software companies (Synopsys 
and Cadence Design Systems) and Professor of 
Electrical engineering and computer science at the 
University of California Berkley, with which MIND has 
established a partnership.
In order to inform MIND’s strategy, which is currently 
under definition, a lengthy process of research 
was carried out. From the research emerged that 
the life sciences truly hold great potential in the 
Lombardy region. Production in the Life Science 
value-chain (excluding services) in Lombardy was 
worth EUR 63.4 billion in 2017, equal to the 31% 
of the national production and to the 12.4% of the 
regional GDP (against the 10% of the national level). 
Health services (including both public and private 
hospitals, specialised facilities and ambulatories 
and socio-sanitary services) in Lombardy were 
responsible in 2015 for production values equal 
to EUR 127 billion (+4,4% compared to 2014), an 
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added value of 76.6 billion (+2.1%), and employed 
1.4 million people in the public sector and 775,000 
in the private or semi-private sector. Growth in the 
Life Science value-chain has been positive in the last 
two years: +13.7% in production value (vs +4.7% at 
the national level) and +13.4% in added value (vs 
+2.7%). Moreover, during the last 5 years employment 
has been rising steadily, especially for young people. 
Beside the desk research, the study also consisted 
in a round of 60 interviews with local high-level 
representative of the Milanese innovation ecosystem, 
including policy makers, university top researchers, 
professors, and deans, venture capitalists, bank 
foundations, and technology transfer experts. 
The rationale behind the industrial/innovation agenda 
is in fact to exploit the capabilities of MIND’s current 
anchors (Human Technopole, Galeazzi Hospital and 
University of Milan) in terms of R&D in order to 
generate economic and social value at scale through 
the creation of a sustainable ecosystem composed of 
research institutions, start-ups, corporations and the 
financial sector. Beside the life science specialisation, 
the innovation strategy has second main focus: the 
city of the future standing for smart city solutions. 
The overall MIND’s innovation/industrial strategy 
is aligned with the regional smart specialisation 
strategy (S3), and the national industry 4.0 strategy. 
MIND will in fact aims at becoming both a gateway 
between Italy’s top innovators and the rest of the 
world, and a one-stop-shop for foreign investments 
in the life sciences. For this reason, MIND is building 
ties with all major agencies operating at regional and 
national level such as Confindustria, Assolombarda, 
Farmindustria, Confindustria dispositivi medici 
and Assobiotec-Federchimica, among others. The 
tenant strategy is a key element of MIND’s overall 
strategy and particular attention is being paid to 
guarantee a robust balance between the need to 
achieve occupancy targets and the need to attract 
top innovators. This is currently being done through 
a multi-faceted approach that includes an open 
call for proposal and one-to-one meeting with top 
global corporations and high value-added start-ups. 
The idea in this case is to maintain strategic 
relationships with the company’s top management 
in order to discuss the involvement of the most 
suitable/innovative units in terms of RDI. Moreover, 
in light of the need for MIND to attract the best 
innovators, the concept of a living lab (MINDLab) 
was also devised as a public open call for ideas. 
The purpose behind MIND Lab is to create a space 
for experimentation based on the interaction of the 
different types of users coexisting within MIND’s 
ecosystem, where its community is generated 
by becoming a testbed for disruptive innovation. 
Efforts in developing an innovation ecosystem along 
with the real estate plan has been rewarded by the 
signature of a partnership with 70 companies (both 
SMEs and multinational) at the end of 2019 and the 
development of a spoke innovation framework called 
‘Federated Innovation’ to enhance their collaboration 
within MIND either by locating in the site or 
developing and testing cutting-edge solutions such as 
automated, electric public transport.
As mentioned before, the project was designed 
around the life science sector, with the aim of 
creating a supporting environment that would 
amplify the socio-economic impacts of the research 
produced by MIND’s tenants. But MIND also aims at 
becoming a new vibrant area of the city, capable of 
attracting different types of publics, from workers 
to students, but also visitors and city users in 
general. This ambition is testified by features of the 
masterplan such as a high density of green spaces 
and the common ground – an approach to ground 
floor design that transforms it in a public space, 
available to all users. Moreover, part of the area is 
currently being let to the entertainment industry: 
two large facilities are being used to film television 
productions, and a large arena is used to host major 
music events.
Geographically, MIND is located in a suburban 
environment right on the border delimited by Milan’s 
outer ring road. It is served by major transport 
connections (railway and road) on the axis that links 
Milan to Italy’s north-west (Torino) and France (Lyon). 
Despite its physical location, MIND aims at becoming 
part of the city, both in terms of connection to the 
downtown area/non-discontinuity of the urban fabric, 
and as a new gravitational centre for Milan’s urban 
life. MIND is also located at the convergence of two 
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main typologies of suburban space, namely small sizes 
urban sprawls such as the municipalities of Baranzate, 
Bollate, Arese, Rho, Roserio, Pero and Mazzo, and a 
formerly industrialised area, which has undergone a 
process of deindustrialisation and is now looking for 
a new identity. Adjacent to MIND are also located two 
recent medium-large scale real estate developments 
(Cascina Merlata and UpTown), and Milan Fair, the 
largest exhibition centre in Europe (750,000 m2). 
Finally, although not a precise vertical specialisation, 
social impact constitutes the main horizontal 
focus for MIND, with Fondazione Triulza already 
operating in this space at the local level and all 
the public Anchors actively engaged in increasing 
positive socio-economic impacts of RDI activities. 
The attention for the social dimension is a milestone 
against which all MIND’s activities will be measured 
through an ad-hoc evaluation framework which 
puts side by side impact consideration with more 
traditional economic input-output indicators. Beside 
evaluation efforts MIND is also strongly committed 
to delivering solutions aimed at scaling its social 
impact. Among these, Programma 2121 is a bespoke 
programme developed in partnership with the Italian 
Ministry of Justice, and all local and regional public 
authorities, to support the work inclusion of detainees 
in the Bollate prison, located just down the road from 
MIND’s main access. The programme, whose pilot 
successfully ended in April 2019 with the first 10 
detainees reintroduced in a productive job outside 
the prison walls, aims at scaling in the next three 
years thanks to the job opportunities offered by 
MIND’s construction sites.
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6. Conclusions and future work
Given the limited amount of cases explored in this 
study, distilling conclusions that can be generalised 
remains somewhat challenging. The evolution of 
different partnership arrangements remains intimately 
tied to very specific situations and to the nature, 
structure and dynamics of individual ecosystems.
The cases where actual PPPs or concessionary 
arrangements have been deployed (cf. first model)87, 
seem to indicate that there are many reasons for 
entering these type of arrangements including: 
(i) a need to keep public debt low; (ii) the desire to 
valorise idle land, buildings or other infrastructures; 
and (iii) to attract private investor management 
expertise and efficiency. The attraction of private 
partners with long-term interests in particular is 
believed not only to bring efficiencies in general 
project realisation but also effectiveness in bringing 
research and innovation to the market. 
Public sector partners willing to promote and drive 
the construction of STPs or Innovation Districts have 
limited ability to plan, construct, and operate complex 
innovation infrastructures. The shift towards more 
extensive use of various forms of Public Private 
Partnerships has occurred organically in different 
places based on local needs and circumstances. 
More complex and wide-ranging arrangements are 
starting to emerge, focused in particular on the 
redevelopment of legacy infrastructure (like is the 
case with Milano and London for example). 
Public Private Partnerships do, however, carry 
considerable risks, from the perspective of public 
sector partners, in particular in relation to: (i) specific 
legal (structuring, enforcement, sanctions and 
remedies, optionality, etc.); (ii) financial (valuation, 
revenue projections, allocation of risks and benefits, 
sustainability, etc.) arrangements and (iii) the need 
to ensure proper alignment with the private sector 
around a shared long term vision for the development 
of a particular STP or Innovation District.
Based on the above, and building on the results of 
the current study, new exploratory work is planned in 
2020-2021 to bring together expertise on both EU 
policies and investment with expertise in finance and 
private investment to develop a new hybrid financial 
model for Innovation Districts. Such a model should 
be able to inform investment strategies of both 
public and private investors (in particular institutional 
investors) and increase the pool of resources and 
expertise available to support the creation and 
operation of Innovation Districts as engines of urban 
transformation and sustainable and inclusive growth. 
The new study will address issues and questions in 
four inter-related domains, namely: (1) financial, 
(2) legal, (3) economic and (4) technological. In the 
technological domain for example, digital data and 
privacy - amongst others - will be considered, as it has 
been identified as an emerging asset class for STPs 
and Innovation Districts. This is especially so in cases 
where Innovation Districts or STPs are integrated in 
the industrial production and urban fabric becoming 
a primary source of data collection, processing and 
storage, on a plethora of societal and economic 
phenomena. This set of functions can be of great 
value for industry and economic partners. Its value 
added is to be assessed and included in designing 
the partnership with the private sector. Definition 
of ownership and exploitation of data must be part 
of a public-private partnership contract. The private 
sector gives great value to this additional source of 
information and its related functions. On the other 
hand, the unbridled exploitation of data – especially 
citizen data – might trigger societal backlashes. 
This is a field to be explored with great attention and 
prudence as it will certainly contribute in addressing 
the question of sustainability but also requires 
consideration of important legal and ethical elements.
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Acronyms
AI: Artificial Intelligence 
AOI: Area of Innovation (see IASP definition) 
BoD: Board of Directors
BOO: Build-Own-Operate
BOOT: Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
BUT: Brno University of Technology 
CC TT: Competence Centre on Technology Transfer at the Joint 
Research Centre 
CEO / COO: Chief Executive Officer / Chief Operating Officer 
DBFO: Design, Build, Finance and Operate 
DCMF: Design-Construct-Manage-Finance 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECA: European Court of Auditors
EDP: Entrepreneurial Discovery Process 
EIB: European Investment Bank 
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund 
EU: European Union 
GBER: General Block Exemption Regulation
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GIID: Global Institute on Innovation Districts
IASP: International Association of Science Parks and Areas of 
Innovation
ICoE: International PPP Centre of Excellence 
ICT: Information and Communication Technologies 
IOT: Internet of Things 
IPO: Initial Public Offering
IPR: Intellectual Property Rights
IT: Information Technology 
JRC: Directorate-General Joint Research Centre, European 
Commission 
JV: Joint Venture 
KPI: Key Performance Indicator 
MEDC: Michigan Economic Development Corporation
MIND: Milano Innovation District
MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NPV: Net Present Value
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
ØICC: Ørestad Innovation City Copenhagen
OPEX: Operating expenses
PPIAF: Public - Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
PPP: Public-Private Partnership 
R&D&I: Research, Development and Innovation 
R&D: Research and Development 
S3: Smart Specialisation Strategies 
SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises 
SPV: Special Purpose Vehicle
S&T: Science and Technology 
STP: Science and Technology Park, or simply science park, see 
full definition by IASP 
TPB: Technologicky Park Brno
TPL: Technology Park Ljubljana 
TTO: Technology Transfer Office 
UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UofM: University of Michigan
VC: Venture Capital
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Annex 1
Annex 1.A
Suggested questions for the personal interviews 
with STP/AOI/Innovation District managers from 
Group/Model 1 (closest to PPP in OECD definition)
Questions regarding the institutional 
set up of the partnership
1. When was the Park/AOI/Innovation district 
founded?
2. What was the key motive to found the 
Park/AOI/Innovation district?
3. Location and macro-economic conditions at the 
time of establishment.
A. Was the Park/AOI/Innovation district established in an 
urban, suburban or rural environment?
B. Was the Park/AOI/Innovation district established in 
times of either: a booming economy, moderately 
growing economy, flat or in recession?
4. What was your rationale for forming a PPP?
A. need of additional capital 
B. administrative efficiency 
C. risk sharing 
D. all of the above 
E. other 
5. How was the PPP formed? 
A. traditional tender under public procurement law
B. competitive dialogue (or equivalent) 
C. public consultation 
D. other 
6. What risks were identified at project inception, 
how were these allocated and to which of the 
partners respectively, and how could these risks 
be mitigated?
7. What type of organizations participated in the PPP 
at each stage (and at the end if different):
A. For the Public Sector:
a. public research institute or organization (PRO)
b. public university
c. local municipality
d. regional authority
e. national authority
f. publicly owned company 
g. combination of the above
h. other 
B. For the Private sector:
a. a bank 
b. a real estate fund
c. a specialized real estate developer company 
d. industry 
e. other 
C. Did the composition of the partnership change 
throughout the life of the project?
a. No
b. Yes. If yes, how 
8. Were the PPP Partners involved in all phases 
of the development? How has the composition 
of the PPP scheme altered during the various 
phases of the project development, including 
possible involvement of new partners? 
A. planning: 
B. construction 
C. operation 
D. other 
9. Throughout the stages of development of the 
project there were: 
A. different types of partnerships 
B. one type from the very beginning till now 
C. other 
10.  What’s the Legal form of the partnership 
A. Concession contract 
B. joint venture 
C. leasing
D. foundation (not for profit) 
E. other 
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11.  Can you provide the Heads of Terms (HOTS) 
anonymised? Usually, the main purpose of this 
document is to outline the requirements for each 
of the partners. 
A. Yes, I can and will
B. No
Questions regarding the contribution 
of each PPP partner
12.  What was the contribution of the: 
A.  Public Partner: 
a. land
b. project conception 
c. stakeholders alignment 
d. feasibility study 
e. technical documentation (incl. regulation and public 
administration procedures) 
f. subsidy 
g. loan
h. guarantees 
i. other 
B. Private Partner: 
a. funding in the form of equity
b. [part of] the project financing (non-equity) 
c. project construction
d. loans
e. management (of the STP, area, innovation district, 
etc.)
f. contributions in kind, please specify 
g. technical expertise (management, design, 
marketing etc.) 
h. other 
13.  Can you share the financial model of the 
investment, in aggregate form? 
Out of the total investment of the project "X million", 
what % approx. was the respective value of: 
A. land provided by the public partner 
(state/region/municipality/university): %
B. existing buildings provided by the public partner: % 
C. project equity provided by the private partner: % 
D. project grant provided by the public partner: % 
E. loan drawn by the private partner %
F. loan drawn from International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs such as the EIB) and guaranteed by the public 
partner %
G. equity from private sector %
H. other 
14.  As per your PPP scheme, does the contract 
foresee/contain any kind of termination clause, in 
case any of the partners should wish to leave the 
partnership?
A. Yes, duration is contractually set at limited period to 
automatically end after  years 
B. Yes, upon request from one of the partners (specify if 
compensation is due) 
C. Only upon breach of the concessionary/partnership 
agreement 
D. No specific rules on this (referral to general 
legislation)
E. other 
15.  What part of the total operational costs of the 
activities included to the PPP comes from: 
A. public source funding: % 
B. private partner[s] % 
C. other 
16.  How is the public financing provided: 
A. through an annual lump sum by the 
government/municipality/university/public partner 
B. in the form of government support programs 
such as specific schemes supporting SMEs, 
incubating/accelerating startups, transfer etc.
C. regional development funds
D. other 
17.  Would the science park / area / innovation district 
still be economically viable/ sustainable without 
the real estate component?
A. yes 
B. yes, but it wouldn't be able to provide as many 
services or services of such a quality to its tenants or 
stakeholders, thus bringing added value 
C. no
Questions regarding the role of the PPP 
partners in the management and operation 
of the science park/AOI/Innovation district
18.  How is the policy and strategy of STP/AOI 
determined?
A. Board representation
B. Presence in management team
C. Inclusion of tenants 
D. other 
19.  Does the public partner define and control 
the policy and strategy of the science 
park/area/innovation district?
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A. Yes. Please explain what the participation is of the 
public partner in the overall policy and strategy of the 
project 
B. Yes, to a limited extent 
C. No 
D. other 
20.  Is the science park/area/innovation district 
strategy aligned with national and regional 
innovation/smart specialization strategies? 
A. Yes, fully 
B. Yes, to an extent 
C. No, the strategy is rather independent and/or specific 
for this project
D. other 
21.  Does the project generate from its usual 
operations: 
A. Surplus income 
B. Deficit /negative balance 
C. other 
22.  In the case of surplus income from operation 
(and after repaying any outstanding loans), how 
is this income invested? 
A. For expansion of infrastructure
B. For special SME innovation 
C. For university entrepreneurship (such as start-up 
programs)
D. For increased salaries or for hiring additional 
staff/researchers
E. For further basic research projects
F. dividends 
G. other 
23.  In case of a deficit, which one of the PPP 
partners is expected to bear it and is there a 
pre-agreed rule on that?
A. The Public Partner[s] 
B. The Private Partner[s] 
C. other 
24.  How are the needs to generate revenue and 
achieve occupancy targets reconciled with the 
need to attract high potential innovators that can 
drive development of the ecosystem as tenants? 
A. Through strict admission criteria
B. Through joint evaluation committees for future 
tenants (which for example have to submit info on 
the scope of their tenancy at the park, avoiding pure 
commercial activities tenancy, etc.) 
C. Through open calls for proposal
D. Other 
25.  Are Chambers of Commerce or Business 
Associations involved in the /science 
park/area/innovation district and if yes - how?
A. Yes – How?
B. No 
C. other
Questions regarding the ex-post 
view of this PPP venture
26.  How do you measure success/impact? ù
27.  What are the positive and what the negative 
lessons learned from the specific PPP STP project?
28. If you had the chance to start from the beginning 
such a venture what are the main parameters 
you would modify compared to the ones that 
were followed?
29.  Do you observe that the value-adding services 
provided in the park/area/district (such as 
operating a TTO) and/or the facilities and 
amenities available for use by the tenants (such 
as entertainment or sport) have increased the 
attractiveness (the demand) as well as the rent 
price per square meter?
A. Yes, especially the services 
B. Yes, especially the facilities and amenities 
C. Yes, both the services and the amenities 
D. No, neither has had a noticeable effect 
E. other 
30. In your experience, how does the stage of 
development of the science park (its maturity) 
influence potential investors' readiness to become 
involved? Is it true that in later stages, where 
commercial traction has been demonstrated, it 
becomes easier to attract private investors? 
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31. What is the latest ratio (%) of the public research 
infrastructure of the park as compared to the 
private real estate developments and buildings 
(measured in total built area used)?
A. The public R&D infrastructure amounts to approx. …… 
% of the total built area
B. The public general infrastructure amounts to approx. 
….. % of the total built area
C. The private partner real estate development amount 
to approx. ….. % of the total built area
32.  Has the park management considered the 
potential for additional revenue streams from e.g. 
becoming a minority investor (or as part of an 
investment fund) in the tenant companies of /or 
companies collaborating with/ the park? 
A. Yes, this is already the case 
B. Yes, options are being explored
C. No, but the management is open to explore further 
D. No, this falls outside the competence of the 
STP/innovation are/district 
E. Other 
33.  Are there other sources of income derived not 
from real-estate or government subsidies? 
A. Exploitation of New patents
B. Exploitation of generated data 
C. other 
34.  Finally what is your key advice to new STP 
developers that choose the pure PPP model?
Annex 1.B
Online Questionnaire for Group/Model 2: 
respondents involving jump-in private investors 
after the commencement of operations
1.  We have understood that in your case the park 
development started as a public initiative but 
in the later phase private investors got more 
involved. Is this right?
2.  Please define which components of the STP/AOI 
were created through a PPP investment? (Multiple 
choice)
A. a. Office space
B. b. Lab space
C. c. Workshop space
D. d. Other, please specify
3.  What was/is the role of each partner in different 
phases the PPP project?
A. planning: 
B. construction 
C. operation 
D. transfer (if applicable) 
E. growth/expansion to new areas 
F. other 
4. In case that the private investors buy or lease 
land with long term contracts from the public 
partner, is the public partner free to spend these 
funds on his financial and/or development goals?
A. Yes
B. If not: what regulations are in place?
5. In case that the private investors buy or lease 
land with long term contracts from the public 
partner for their own development purposes, 
are there park specific regulations regarding the 
investment?
A. No
B. Yes, architectural
C. Yes, usage profile restricted (industry, tech, start-ups...)
D. Yes, obligations to link into energetical, infrastructural, 
media concepts
E. Yes, obligations to build within a certain time
F. Yes, only leasehold
G. other 
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6.  What control do you (the STP/AOI Managers) 
have about the type of companies that a private 
investor who has developed premises in your 
park may wish to rent space to? 
A. STP/area/district can veto some of these companies, if 
they don’t meet the general admission criteria (set by 
the public partner) 
B. Private investors can bring in companies at their own 
full discretion
C. Other 
7. Is the Private Partner Investor allowed to settle 
and stay in the Science Park indefinitely or do you 
envisage some time limitation? 
A. Private Partner can stay indefinitely (land/buildings 
are sold)
B. Private Partner has been granted time-limited 
lease/concession to use the land/building for limited 
period 
C. Other 
8.  What % of the total built floor area in the 
Park/AOI is given (or planned to be given) to 
Private Partner Investors and what % will be 
kept by the Public Partner (used mostly for public 
research infrastructure or public services)?
A. % foreseen for Private investors 
B.  % foreseen for Public Partner 
C. Other 
9.  What are the consequences if the Private Partner 
does not deliver what was originally agreed 
or put don in regulations (e.g. does not pay 
the agreed service charge, dilutes the agreed 
company focus, does not build in time, etc.)?
10.  What other risks were identified, how were 
these allocated and to which of the partners 
respectively (public owner vs. private investors), 
and how could these risks be mitigated? 
11.  Would the STP/AOI development project be 
economically viable/ sustainable without the real 
estate contribution from private investors? 
A. Yes
B. yes, but it wouldn't be able to provide as many 
services or services of such a quality to its tenants or 
stakeholders, thus bringing added value
C. no other 
12.  Would you define the interest from Private 
Partner Investors in the real estate development 
at your science park/area/district as higher 
or lower as opposed to locations outside the 
park (which normally have less regulations / 
requirements)?
A. Higher
B. Lower 
C. Other 
Annex 1.C
Online Questionnaire for Group/Model 3: 
Management by Private Partner
You have kindly answered our questionnaire 
regarding your PPP experience. We are trying 
to get some more detailed information on how/
why the management of your Park/AOI has 
been entrusted to a private organisation.
1. We have understood that in your case the park 
management has been transferred to a private 
management organization. Is this right?
2.  Please describe the arrangements you have 
for participation of the private sector in the 
management structures of STP: e.g. Board of 
Directors (BoD) participation of institutional 
partners from private sector like: 
A. Chambers of Commerce 
B. Association of Industries
C. National-regional banks
D. Personalities from the business world
E. Other 
3.  Please describe if there is any financial 
contribution in form of equity by any of the 
private partners in the management company of 
the STP/area/district. 
A. Yes
B. No 
C. Other 
4.  Who has the majority at the Board of Directors? 
Who appoints the CEO? 
A. Public Partner 
B. Private Partner 
C. Other 
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5.  What are the future plans and methods of 
development and financing? 
6.  How are the powers of the Private 
Management/Operator defined?
7.  To what extent is the Private Company Operator 
allowed to manage the assets of the [at least 
partially] public science park? 
8.  How does the Public Partner ensure that the 
Private Operator acts not only in private interest 
but also ensure that Public/Policy considerations 
are taken into account in all of the management 
actions? 
9.  Are there any risks identified? How are these 
allocated (owner vs. management), and how can 
these risks be mitigated? 
10.  How do you measure success/impact? 
A. Self-assessment process/system
B. External evaluation process/system
C. Other
11. Kindly tell us the main indicators (KPI) that you use:
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Annex 2
Results of the Specific Online Surveys for Groups 2 and 3 
In an attempt to avoid repetition we include here the additional information that has not already been 
presented (or not graphically presented) in the main body of the report.
Annex 2.A
Results from the survey to Group 2: 
JUMP-IN MODEL (Group 2)
Universe: The questionnaire was sent to 16 
organisations from 8 countries (Botswana, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, France, Germany, South Korea, Spain and 
United Kingdom).
Sample: 8 organisations from 6 countries (Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, South Korea and Spain) 
replied to the questionnaire.
STP/AOI/Innovation district sample basic data
MODEL 2
JUMP-IN MODEL 
or late stage private investment 
The park or district is launched and owned 
by a public agent. At a certain point, private 
investors are given the opportunity to develop 
some elements of the park and exploit these. 
In most cases the private investors build offices 
and/or workshop space to rent it out to tenants.
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Figure 18. STPs/AOIs sample – Year of creation
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Figure 19. STPs/AOIs – built area (m2)
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Figure 20. STPs/AOIs – resident companies
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Figure 21. STPs/AOIs – employees
Source: IASP 2019 (Figures 15, 16, 17)
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JUMP-IN MODEL or late stage 
private investment responses
1. We have understood that in your case the 
park/area development started as a public 
initiative but in the later phase private investors 
got more involved. Is this right?
2. Question two is answered in full in main body 
of the report, see chapter 4. 
3. What was/is the role of each partner in different 
phases of the PPP project? Please describe the 
actions taken and by whom in each phase.
Summary of the responses: this question was asked 
and understood rather broadly. In most cases the 
private investors’ role is either to build several 
buildings (which can happen also at later stages of 
the project development and growth and which is the 
typical model for a jump-in partnership) or to actually 
deliver the full construction (normally through 
standard procurement procedures for construction). 
• One of the science parks responded that for the 
planning, construction and subsequent operation 
the private partner solely delivers the resources 
for the project implementation respecting the 
requirements and code of action of the STP.
• In another case while the construction was 
completed entirely by the private partner, the 
activities during the planning and operation 
phases were/are taking place under public 
supervision (still lead by the private partner).
• It can also be that the planning is entirely public, 
while the construction, operation and growth 
phases happen jointly in partnership. 
• Finally, in one of the project respondents both 
the public and private partners are active in all 
phase meaning that the public partner (park 
management company) develops and operates 
during incubation and growth phases, while the 
private investors follow with focus on grown-up 
companies leaving the protected incubation 
period (either as real estate investors or invest 
directly into their own grown-up company 
straight into their own premises). 
4. In the case that the private investors buy or 
lease land with long term contracts from the 
public partner, is the public partner free to 
spend these funds on their financial and/or 
development goals?
A. If not, what regulations are in place?
Answer
Basically, the public partners have to transfer the 
sales proceed to the public owner - the regional 
government; however, in many cases, the latter 
gave the permit to reinvest the revenues into 
further development of the park infrastructure.
No
100%
Y E S     
Source: IASP 2019
Figure 22. Started as public initiative
Figure #: PPP Models in STPs/AOIs
88%
Y E S     
13%
 NO
Source: IASP 2019
Figure 23. Freedom of public partners to spend funds
Public–Private Partnership for Science and Technology Parks JRC
Annex 2.A | 87
5. In the case that the private investors buy 
or lease land with long term contracts from 
the public partner for their own development 
purposes, are there STP/AOI/Innovation district 
specific regulations regarding the investment?
6. What control do you (the STP/AOI/Innovation 
District Managers) have over the type of 
companies that a private investor who has 
developed premises in your park may wish to 
rent space to?
7. Is the Private Partner Investor allowed to 
settle and stay in the STP/AOI/Innovation 
District indefinitely or do you envisage some 
time limitation?
8. What percentage of the total built floor area 
in the STP/AOI/Innovation district is given 
(or planned to be given) to Private Partner 
Investors, and what percentage will be kept 
by the Public Partner (used mostly for public 
research infrastructure or public services)?
Answer
Percentage foreseen 
for Private investors
Percentage foreseen 
for Public Partner
65% 35%
80% 20%
10% 50%
70% 30%
5% 95%
70% 30%
30% 70%
12,5%
88%
No Yes, usage profile restricted 
(industry, tech, start–ups…)
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Figure 24. Specific regulations fot STP/AOI investment
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Figure 25. Type of control STP/AOI managers have over types 
of companies proposed by private investors
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Figure 26. Time limitations for private partners to stay in 
STP/AOI
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9. What are the consequences if the Private Partner 
does not deliver what was originally agreed 
or put down in regulations (e.g. does not pay 
the agreed service charge, dilutes the agreed 
company focus, does not build in time, etc.)?
Answer
Penalties or other legal actions; reversal of the purchase 
contract
Terms are specified in the long-term lease and there are 
financial penalties
The City Council can exercise its right of withdrawal.
Our park is managed by a public body (Regional Development 
Agency). As we are only able to sell plots, and the market 
demands buildings (offices and workshops), we collaborate 
with private investors, which assume the investment in 
buildings construction and offer the premises for rent.
We have specific rule in the contracts
If the Private Partner does not deliver what was originally 
agreed, they are subject of fine according to the contract.
10. What other risks were identified, how were 
these allocated and to which of the partners 
respectively (public owner vs. private investors), 
and how could these risks be mitigated?
Answer
Low uptake of land parcels development in the park-mitigated 
by offering special economic zone incentives and more 
aggressive promotion
It will cope with the risk by government management
Carrying out a continuous control.
If they pretend to rent the premises to a company that 
doesn´t meet our requirement, we send a negative report to 
the municipality, so the company wouldn´t get the licence.
If we sell a plot and the private partners do not build the 
constructions in a certain time or the building is not according 
to the approved project, we can get the plot back.
When the companies fail.
The main risk addressed in the process of setting the deals 
is the usage profile of the tenant companies. The risk is 
mitigated by setting a threshold limit. The hosting STP team has 
established a business development unit that is in an active 
collaboration with the private investor. It is aiming to assist their 
efforts to attract the most appropriate and value adding tenant 
companies to the STP/AOI.
No big risks as real estate development is a very straight 
forward business. In terms of services and community, the 
STP still plays significant role and brings extra value for 
the real estate.
11. Would the STP/AOI/Innovation District 
development project be economically viable/ 
sustainable without the real estate contribution 
from private investors?
12. How would you define the interest from Private 
Partner Investors in the real estate development 
at your science park/area/district, compared 
to locations outside the STP/AOI/Innovation 
district (which normally have fewer regulations / 
requirements)?
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Figure 27. Viability of STP/AOI without private investor support
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Figure 28. Interest in STP/AOI real estate from private 
investors compared to other locations
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Annex 2.B
Results from the survey to Group 3: 
Management Partnership Model
MODEL 3
Management partnership
The park or district is promoted, launched and owned 
by the public sector but the owners outsource the 
management of the project to a private company, 
or invite the private sector to participate (with 
capital increase or other forms of contribution) in 
the management company of the STP, or take over 
the management entirely. The responsibilities, risks 
and profits of the parties are fixed by a negotiation 
between the public and the private partners.
Universe: The questionnaire was sent to 15 
organisations from 12 countries (Austria, China, 
Colombia, Greece, Iran, Portugal Romania, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom).
Sample: 4 organisations from 3 countries (Austria, 
China and Turkey) replied to the questionnaire. 
Table 6. STP/AOI/Innovation district sample basic data 
Year of 
creation
Built area 
[m2]
Number of 
companies
Number of 
employees
2002 372,000 260 3,900
2005 34,000 70 1,300
2006 7,000 78 596
1994 770,000 1,000 35,000
Management partnership responses88
1. We have understood that in your case the 
STP/AOI/Innovation district management has 
been transferred to a private management 
organisation. Is this right?
2. What are the future plans and methods of 
development and financing?
Answer
Our technopark is self-sustainable.  
For some new investment, we are planning to use our own 
resources with some loan.
Development of rental turnover, occupancy rate increase, 
construction of new buildings and rental space.
Science and technology park management finances itself by 
the rents, projects, grants, provided services etc. 
In development of the area from the 10th year of the 
creation a Build-Operate-Transfer mentality is accepted. 
For sure the common social and trading areas are built and 
operated by the management.
3. How are the powers of the Private 
Management/Operator defined?
Answer
Management is an Inc.
Management and development of the science park
The private management has a visionary operation and it 
gives flexibility
Strong
4. To what extent is the Private Company Operator 
allowed to manage the assets of the (at least 
partially) public STP/AOI/Innovation district?
Answer
Land is fully allocated to the management company. Some 
rights are for general manager (GM) up to a level and all 
rights are for Board of Directors.
100%
Fully permitted
More than half, when it is necessary.
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5. How does the Public Partner ensure that 
the Private Operator acts not only in private 
interest but also ensure that Public/Policy 
considerations are taken into account in all of 
the management actions?  
Answer:
All technoparks in Turkey are running under a law 
and Public/Policy consideration is defined in that law.
Have to prove management decisions equally (state/region/
city)
The public partner is represented by the governor of the city. 
So, it’s his natural duty to promote the Ecosystem
Operate the company in accordance with company law.
6. Are there any risks identified? How are these 
allocated (owner vs. management), and how 
can these risks be mitigated? 
Answer:
There is some audit done by the Ministry (running the law) 
and by Holding, separately, to reduce the risk.
Occupancy rate too low, risks at management.
STPs are operated under a law and the director of the board 
is the governor of the city so there is not any identified risk.
Operate the company in accordance with company law. 
Ensure that major decisions are passed through the Board of 
Directors for discussion.
7. How do you measure success/impact?
Answer:
Both self and external evaluation.
External evaluation process/system.
Ministry of industry and technology.
External evaluation process/system.
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Brainstormed Questions
The questions listed below have arisen before and during the discussions among the expert authors engaged 
for the present study. Despite the fact that it falls outside the scope of the study to attempt to answer all of 
them or answer them in detail it is nevertheless considered useful to list these brainstormed questions and 
some identified issues. The case studies have directly or indirectly answered part of them. For a list of questions 
that were actually asked and discussed with science park managers please refer to the Annex 1. Also be aware 
that some of these questions are so complex that they would require a separate study. 
At the inception phases of a Science Park or Innovation 
Districts it might be difficult to convince potential 
real estate developers to commit to a long-term 
collaboration. Is it only when a project matures that a 
PPP structure becomes feasible/suitable or is it better 
to organise from the very beginning? 
Does the public actor effectively serve as a catalyst in 
facilitating the development of innovation ecosystem 
and if so, how? 
In theory, private investors seem to have a conservative 
approach and insist their involvement be based on 
a sound business model guaranteeing good returns 
on the real estate side. However, if you bring in too 
many real estate developers or involve them too early 
without proper arrangements you might end up with 
the wrong mix of tenants and/or give up control over 
the project’s overall development letting it become a 
pure business park. How do you find the balance? 
Is there still a potential for legacy sites (brownfield) 
that have been mismanaged?
Is it true that in rural areas a much greater 
intervention is needed to achieve the same results as 
in buoyant larger city environments? 
Broader regional impact of successful ecosystems 
if measured would be the impact of the project 
multiplied by x 1.8 up to 2.89 Is this achievable in 
practice? Some of the experts expressed that this has 
already been proven in cases where the focus is on 
high value-added deep tech. 
The success of each project is claimed to depend on 
the attraction of a critical mass of stakeholders to 
operate in or interact with the science park. How do 
you actually attract stakeholders? 
Developing a business park and office space rented to 
software or purely service-based companies should not 
be taken as equivalent to Science and Technology Parks 
/Innovation Districts. In this regard, to what extent can 
the intensity of technology transfer activities as well 
as other added value services be used to measure the 
success of large multi-stakeholder projects? 
Investors always consider the financial risks. Under 
what conditions would large-scale experienced private 
investor developers such as Lendlease90 invest in cities 
where the investment climate (the economic, financial, 
and socio-political conditions) are less favourable and 
where the real estate market is weaker? 
Is the efficiency of the private sector or is the reduced 
financial burden on the public partner the key incentive 
/ expected benefit for organising a PPP/concession in 
the science, technology and innovation domain? 
Have the value-added services provided in the park 
and/or the facilities and amenities available for use 
by the tenants increased the attractiveness as well as 
the rent price per square meter? 
How does the stage of development of the science park 
(its maturity) influence potential investors’ readiness 
to become involved? Is it true that in later stages, 
when commercial traction has been demonstrated, 
it becomes easier to attract private investors?
… :
…
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